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SYNTHESIS: KYOTO PROTOCOL FLEXIBILITY MECHANISMS AND THE
STATE
Acknowledgments
There are probably as many ways to a doctoral dissertation as there are doctoral candidates –
and by this I do not mean methodological choices or the like that one can agree or disagree
with, or by which the end result can be evaluated. I mean the personal process that first
convinces one to get started with such a project, and the process that leads one to the end
result. That personal process is often in many ways dependent on interaction with other
people.
First of all, I would like to thank professors Tuomas Kuokkanen and Jonas Ebbesson for
agreeing to review this work, and for providing me with a number of critical remarks in a
positive spirit. I also wish to thank Tuomas Kuokkanen specifically for kindly agreeing to act
as my opponent.
My supervisor, Judge at the Supreme Administrative Court, former professor Kari
Kuusiniemi, first introduced research work to me, got me started – yet gave me all the room I
needed to choose and limit the topic I wanted to write about – and opened doors to Nordic and
international environmental law research networks. These networks, through which I have met
likeminded colleagues, even made friends, have proven priceless over the years.
I am also ever so grateful to professor Anne Kumpula, my supervisor, whose door has always
been open to me, and who has had – seemingly endless – patience to listen to my ideas, yet
with a critical ear. She has been able to support and encourage me even when nothing seemed
to be happening, and when I was myself in doubt as to whether I would ever manage to finish
this work.
Professor Hans-Christian Bugge has contributed to this work greatly by kindly commenting on
my work, as well as making it possible for me to visit the Faculty of Law at the University of
Oslo several times to explore libraries, gather material and meet with other researchers. These
visits have indeed proven worthwhile, pleasant and at one point even quite crucial – thank
you!
International law, alongside environmental law, turned out to play an important role in this
study. In this field professor Lauri Hannikainen has acted as an important guide. Lauri has
never ceased to have an interest to my ideas, helped me keep up the positive spirit, and
provided me with lots of good advice, together with the informal researcher group of
international law (EUKAN) involving researchers of international law at the Faculty of Law at
the University of Turku and the Institute of Human Rights at the Åbo Akademi University.
Thank you! Within the field of international law I also wish to thank sincerely professor Martti
Koskenniemi, who, in spite of his undoubtedly very busy timetable, at one critical point
helped me overcome a significant hurdle. I truly enjoyed the discussions I had with him and
benefited from the help I got from him. These are greatly appreciated.
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1. Background and structure of the study
1.1 Climate Change
The period from 1901 to 2005 has witnessed a warming of the global average surface
temperature greater than any since at least the 11th century.1 This implies a temperature
increase of about 0,74°C over the past hundred years, although the warming has been neither
steady nor the same in different seasons or in different locations.2 The development has also
shown an accelerating trend.3 The other side of the coin is the nearly worldwide reduction in
glacier and small ice cap mass and extent in the 20th century.4
Temperature changes are somewhat obvious and easily measured – more so than many of the
other changes in climate. It must, however, be kept in mind that the whole climate system is
affected, thus, the changes manifest themselves in many different ways, and uncertainties as
well as regional differences may be substantial.5 In any case, it seems to have been established
that changes in the climate system can be abrupt and widespread.6
Changes in precipitation patterns are an example of the multiple manifestations of climate
change. These changes seem to be occurring in the amount, intensity, frequency and type of
precipitation. There is also evidence that winter precipitation has increased at high latitudes –
thus in different areas than drought – although uncertainties exist. Especially precipitation
intensity and the risk of heavy rain and snow events seem to have increased.7
Warming accelerates land surface drying and increases the potential incidence and severity of
droughts. For example a severe drought affecting central and southwest Asia in recent years
1 IPCC 2007 p. 249.
2 IPCC 2007 p. 252. See also IPCC 2007 p. 316 and passim.
3 See IPCC 2007 p. 318.
4 See IPCC 2007 p. 317. This is, however, also due to changes in precipitation patterns.
5 IPCC 2007 pp. 254, 265, 271.
6 IPCC 2007 p. 775.
7 IPCC 2007 p. 262.
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appears to be the worst since at least 1980. Drought has also become widespread throughout
much of Africa and more common in the tropics and subtropics.8
Snow cover as well as seasonally frozen ground has decreased in many parts of the Northern
Hemisphere, and more precipitation is falling as rain instead of snow. Sea ice extents have
decreased substantially in the Arctic and the mountain glaciers have been shrinking.9
Climate change manifests itself also in extreme events, such as heat waves, droughts, floods
and hurricanes. Since 1950, there has been detected an increase in the number of heat waves,
as well as in the extent of regions affected by droughts.10 It is also likely that there has been a
poleward shift as well as an increase in Northern Hemisphere winter storm track activity over
the second half of the 20th century.11 For extratropical cyclones, the trends in storm intensity
are positive for recent decades. This would entail greater wind speeds and more intense
precipitation in those storms. Furthermore, the density of strong cyclones increases while the
density of weak and medium-strength cyclones decreases. In addition, there is likely to be a
poleward shift of storm tracks in both hemispheres.12
The rising sea level is often pointed out as an example of an utmost concrete manifestation of
the global climate change.13 Sea level has, indeed, been rising throughout the 20th century, and
the rate thereof has increased during the 1990s and seems to keep rising.14 The rise is partly
due to the warming up of the seawater, which leads to the expansion thereof, thus increasing
the volume of the global ocean and producing thermosteric sea level rise15. Another reason is
the melting of continental ice and mountain glaciers.16
8 IPCC 2007 pp. 261, 263.
9 IPCC 2007 pp. 317, 374; see also p. 776.
10 IPCC 2007 pp. 308, 317.
11 IPCC 2007 p. 308.
12 IPCC 2007 pp. 316, 786-789.
13 See e.g. IPCC 2007 p. 408.
14 IPCC 2007 pp. 318, 409.
15 See e.g. IPCC 2007 p. 414.
16 IPCC 2007 p. 812; see also IPCC 2007 pp. 417-418.
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Vegetation boundaries will migrate due to global warming, thus leading to large and rapid
changes in areas close to those boundaries.17
These changes have been connected to the immense increase over the last couple of decades in
the emissions of the so-called greenhouse gases, of which carbon dioxide (CO2) is the most
common.18 This increase in emissions has enhanced the initially natural mechanism where the
sun’s radiation is reflected off the Earth’s surface and trapped by CO2 and other greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere. The most important activities behind the increase are combustion of
fossil fuels in e.g. energy production and traffic, and deforestation. Others include agriculture,
waste and industry.19
A peculiarity in the climate change phenomenon is that it is happening to the climate as a
whole regardless of the location of the greenhouse gas emissions. So, what has been said about
long range air pollution in general – that it does not recognize state boundaries – is especially
true for climate change. The effects vary very much regionally, but greenhouse gas emissions
do not have local polluting effects in the same way as sulphur emissions, for instance. What is
essential is the percentage of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, not their location.20 Thus, it
is also of no importance to the occurrence of the consequences where emission reductions take
place.
As climate change is largely human induced and has an influence on human settlements and
societies, climate change is not only, or purely an environmental problem, but also a social and
societal, as well as structural, problem. The structures that lie behind climate change were
created already at the dawn of industrialisation. Thus, the solutions need to be found in the
society, and these solutions need to be able to tackle the omnipresence of the causes of the
problem.21 There is still a great deal of uncertainty in the scientific understanding of the
problem and its complex nature, which sets a challenge to the international response. The
17 IPCC 2007 p. 777.
18 See e.g. IPCC 2007 p. 137.
19 See Oberthür & Ott 1999 pp. 3-9.
20 See Melkas 2001 p. 9.
21 See Beck 1990 p. 228.
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realisation and recognition of this connection between human activities and climate have
brought about the political process discussed below.
The emissions are also most often caused by activities that are crucial to the economies of
states, such as energy production, industry and transport. In practice this has led to a clash of
climate policies aiming at curbing the emissions and mitigating the problem on one hand, and
economic policies and development on the other hand, as climate policies are often seen as
requiring either bringing development to a halt or investing in new, expensive technologies,
that poor countries cannot afford and that are politically controversial in richer ones.
This clash is, however, to some extent a misguided interpretation of the state of affairs. The
unequal distribution of the consequences of climate change is also causing increasing
inequalities between different countries, as poorer countries are often hit the hardest. But these
countries often do not have the funds to cover for the damages, which also creates a need for
investments and assistance from the developed world. This, too, sets a challenge to the
international response.
1.2 How to Get There – the Approach
This study started out with an intuition that the position of states defined by international law –
“position” referring to constraint or lack thereof imposed upon states – has changed from that
described in international law schoolbooks. That the prevalence of state sovereignty as a prima
facie freedom to act as one pleases has given way to understanding this freedom as a
competence that is to begin with limited. The intuition included the perception that the change
has been entailed by the multiplication of the international obligations undertaken by states
and the increase in the volume of international law. From a different direction, the so-called
second generation environmental problems, of which ozone depletion together with climate
change is an example, have presented demands to the state-driven international system.  This
change is manifested by, inter alia, co-operative instruments such as the Kyoto Protocol
flexibility mechanisms. In these arrangements obligations imposed upon states by
international law, albeit in practice agreed upon by states themselves, may be rearranged and
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renegotiated among two or more states. But the freedom to do so is not unlimited, and may
involve also other actors than states. Are these limitations of the freedom reflections of a more
general development of the law? What kind of demands does this set to the implementation of
the Kyoto Protocol flexibility mechanisms?
The approach used in the study has been somewhat dogmatic – the kind that Immi Tallgren
has described in her dissertation as “the world according to a lawyer”22. The focus is on the
systematisation and development of international law within the particular framework of the
United Nations regime on climate change. The discussion addresses environmental and
international law, and the general doctrine23, especially principles, of these disciplines have
been the starting point in the discussion – thus, a principled approach has been used in the
discussion.24 The discussion takes, however, the point of view of environmental law – thus,
more general conclusions as to the role and position of the state in international law in general
or in other fields than international environmental law cannot be drawn.
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change has been the starting point in
the discussion. The questions to which answers have been sought in this study have been, first,
whether the Kyoto Protocol flexibility mechanisms may be taken as implications of a change
in the position into which states are put by international law, and second, whether they, on the
other hand, also contribute to such a change.
The discussion has been formalist in the sense that it relies on treaties – most importantly the
Climate Convention and the Kyoto Protocol – as the most significant source of international
law. Rigid formalism is, however, rejected especially when it comes to principles of law, as
has been explained above. Principles bring a material element to law, they promote
substantive goals instead of merely providing for procedures. In this way, they have been said
22 See Tallgren 2001 pp. 13-18.
23 It should be pointed out here that the significance of general doctrines has been stressed mainly in Continental
European legal culture, whereas in Anglo-American legal culture such aspirations have met with suspicion, see
Tuori 2002 p. 170.
24 See e.g. Ranta 2001 pp. 22-23, according to whom a principled approach and the use of material criteria is well
founded in the interpretation of and research concerning environmental regulation, stigmatised by flexible norms
and balancing of interests. The relationship between international and environmental law, and the possibility of
an international environmental law will be discussed later in this synthesis, as it has significance also as to the
substance of this study. See also e.g. Pirjatanniemi 2005 pp. 93-94.
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European legal culture, whereas in Anglo-American legal culture such aspirations have met with suspicion, see
Tuori 2002 p. 170.
24 See e.g. Ranta 2001 pp. 22-23, according to whom a principled approach and the use of material criteria is well
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to promote the consistency and coherence of law and to improve predictability.25 They have
been observed and discussed as guides of and setters of limits to states’ activities, and
provided the yardsticks against which the rules within this particular framework, the Kyoto
Protocol flexibility mechanisms, have been reflected. Also case law has been relied on for
authoritative interpretations.
The choice of principles to be discussed has been based on an estimate of what is most
relevant to the use of the mechanisms and to their functioning as means and aids of fulfilment
of the obligations based on the Kyoto Protocol. These principles are the principle of common
but differentiated responsibility, the precautionary principle, sustainable development, state
sovereignty, its derivative the sovereign equality of states, the principle of equity, and the
polluter pays principle. Most of these have been included in Article 3 to the Climate
Convention. Sovereign equality and the polluter pays principle have been included in the
discussion as they may well be seen to lie behind the system’s logic. The most significant of
these to the position of states have, however, turned out to be sovereignty, equity and an
application of equity, common but differentiated responsibility. In addition to these, cost-
effectiveness as a goal of environmental law and policy has been addressed, mainly in relation
to some of the principles mentioned above. Furthermore, a general doctrine applicable to the
mechanisms has been sought and interpretations made in the light of that doctrine.
The use of value-laden principles as yardsticks is far from unproblematic. Flexible and open
standards, examples of which principles are, have faced criticism especially within the most
recent international law discussions, although they have received a significant degree of
popularity within environmental law. Whereas one has accused this development of the law of
e.g. focusing on identifying concerns and actors as well as sheer vagueness, and due to this,
leaving material regulation to be decided contextually, leading to increasing managerialism,
casuistry and hegemonic tendencies, without possibilities of politically contesting the
decisions taken, the other promotes exactly those as efficient means of reaching the set
25 See Tuori 2002 pp. 162, 170 and 179, who points out that “new, instrumentally devised regulations always
constitute a threat to the systemic character of the law. The legal order reacts to this threat, arising from the
political determination of legislation, at the level of legal culture; at this level the equilibrium, disturbed on the
surface by legislative interventions, is restored”, that “the systematic nature of the legal order presupposes, on the
one hand, its consistency and, on the other, its coherence”, and that “the coherence of the legal order stems from
its principled nature”. See also Ranta 2001 pp. 116-117.
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objectives and promoting the generally accepted values, thus, on instrumental grounds.26 Of
course, a researcher, especially one of law, can never be completely objective and unbound by
values. The same applies to law itself. But a certain aspiration towards objectivity should
certainly always be present, even if objectivity as such can never be reached.
The study has been carried out in four separate articles. In the first one27, “Overview”, I
outlined in a general manner the legal framework built to respond to the problem of climate
change, and how the latitude for state action is limited in that system. The article described the
regulatory framework at a general level, as well as the legal challenges that one faces and the
approaches developed in trying to provide a response to a problem that has to do with such a
difficult element to grasp as climate.
I chose to devote a great deal of attention to principles – those adopted in the Convention as
well as one principle in addition to those, that may been seen to lie behind the functions of the
treaty regime, the polluter pays principle – in a rather lengthy manner due to their nature as
more long-term elements in the legal system that are less liable to change momentarily. Thus,
the article outlined the approach that defined the work also later on.
In the second article, “Sovereignty and Equity”28, the international law concepts of
sovereignty and equity, and their role in the climate regime were discussed – a discussion that
has turned out to be quite relevant considering the whole study. The discussion followed the
approach adopted in the whole study. For both concepts I first discussed the way they have
presented themselves in international law, then in environmental law and finally in the climate
regime.
That discussion has continued in my third and fourth articles, of which the third one addressed
emissions trading and the fourth joint implementation (JI) and the clean development
mechanism (CDM)29. In these articles the idea has been to discuss sovereign equality, a
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component of state sovereignty, and its compatibility with cost-effectiveness, a criterion that
has entered international environmental law from the national level, and that calls for a spatial
flexibility also at the international level that seems to run counter to the equality of states. The
discussion has concentrated on the analysis of the two legal concepts on the basis of legal
literature and relevant international case law.
In addition to the themes mentioned above, the actors in the system have been throughout the
study a recurring theme. Is the climate regime a genuinely international system that relies on
states? Or do the “legal entities”, taken account of in several places in the official
documentation, have a role that carries such a significance that changes this state of affairs? In
this synthesis I have tried to pull the threads together and draw some general conclusions.
In addition to drawing conclusions, this synthesis also aims at drawing a picture of a post-
modern international environmental law, and the state within that framework. The climate
regime is viewed as a manifestation of this phase in the development of international
environmental law, especially its two central features, notably its nature as a special regime
and the significance of guiding principles within the framework. The presence of a regime as
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2. The State and International Environmental Obligations
2.1 The United Nations Climate Change Regime
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (the Climate Convention)
constitutes the basis for the Climate Regime, the ongoing political process engaging most of
the world’s states in co-operation to mitigate climate change. It was opened for signature at the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The
most significant of the outcomes of the Climate Convention is that it created a basis for the
international co-operation.
First, the Convention created an organisation for the co-operation. The annual Conference of
the Parties (COP) is at the centre stage in that organisation as the supreme decision making
body30. The COP also inter alia supervises the implementation of the Convention and related
documents (Article 7). In addition to the COP, the organisation consists of the secretariat
(Article 8), the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA, Article 9)
and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI, Article 10). Furthermore, the Convention
sets up a financial system (Article 11).
The Convention also sets some preconditions to the co-operation and the results achieved.
Article 2 of the Convention defines the overall objective of the Convention and the co-
operation based thereon:
“The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal
instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to
achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the
Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved
within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally
30 There is, however, no consensus concerning the legally binding nature of the decisions taken by the COP and
the COP/MOP, on this discussion see Brunnée 2002 pp. 23-26, 33-34, 37-38, who also concludes that “whether
or not the mechanism rules, formally, are legally binding, at least de facto they significantly affect the position of
a party under the agreement”. Brunnée argues for an interactional understanding of international law, according
to which international law arises from a mutually generative process, and thus entails a wider understanding of
bindingness. The same understanding is present in this study. But cf. Yamin & Depledge 2004 p. 8.
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to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened
and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable
manner.”
Article 3 of the Convention recognises a few, already in international environmental law
somewhat established, principles that are also binding in this context. These are equity and its
concrete manifestation the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, the
precautionary principle, cost-effectiveness and sustainable development31. Thus, these
principles contribute to setting limits and preconditions to measures taken by states, both
domestically and in their international undertakings, as well as to the implementation of the
flexibility mechanisms. In this way they limit the discretion available to states.
In addition to the objective and the guiding principles the Convention imposes certain general
obligations upon the states parties. The obligations are differentiated between developed and
developing states – Annex I and non-Annex I -states32  so that some of the obligations are
imposed upon Annex I states only and some upon all states parties. The obligations imposed
upon all parties (Article 4.1) are mainly concerned with developing domestic policies,
developing technologies, adaptation to climate change, exchange of information etc. The
obligations imposed upon Annex I states only (Articles 4.2-4.10) are more detailed. Article 4.2
even includes a quantified goal for emission reductions: The aim is to reach the level of
greenhouse gas emissions of 1990. This can be reached either individually or in co-operation
with other parties, which is the first appearance of the idea of a joint implementation of
commitments in this context.
The special position accorded to developing states and states with economies in transition, as
well as the obligation imposed upon developed states to take into account this special position
is also brought up, although a distinction is made between these two groups. States with
economies in transition are separated from other industrialised states by excluding them from
Annex II to the Convention (all industrialised states are listed in Annex I), whereas developing
states – or states that within this particular regime are considered developing – are excluded
from both.
31 I have addressed several of these in separate articles.
32 Annex I to the Climate Convention includes a list of states that are considered developed states within the
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The need for special treatment of the developing countries is also recognised in Article 3 of
the Convention concerning the principles applicable in the regime, by the introduction of the
principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities,
by the requirement imposed upon the developed countries that they take the lead in measures
to combat climate change, and by requiring a full consideration of “the specific needs and
special circumstances of developing countries”. “Policies and measures” should “be
appropriate for the specific conditions of each Party and should be integrated with national
development programmes, taking into account that economic development is essential for
adopting measures to address climate change.” The duty to promote sustainable economic
growth is aimed at particularly enhancing that growth in developing countries. It has been
seen, in general, that economic development is necessary to address the problem of climate
change, and that by no means should a choice between the environment and economic
development have to be made.
Also the general obligations introduced in Article 4 of the Convention are differentiated
between developed and developing countries. Account shall be taken of the special situations
of the different categories of developing countries33. Furthermore, the communication of
information relating to the implementation of commitments has been differentiated according
to Article 12 of the Convention.
The Kyoto Protocol is the first and so far the only Protocol concretising the Climate
Convention. It was adopted in Kyoto, Japan, at the third COP, and entered into force in 2005.
The most significant part of the contents of the Protocol are the quantified emission limitation
and reduction commitments, imposed upon Annex B states only, and differentiated state-by-
state within that group.34
33 Least developed countries; small island countries; countries with low-lying coastal areas; countries with arid
and semi-arid areas, forested areas and areas liable to forest decay; countries with areas prone to natural disasters;
countries with areas liable to drought and desertification; countries with areas of high urban atmospheric
pollution; countries with areas with fragile ecosystems, including mountainous ecosystems; countries whose
economies are highly dependent on income generated from the production, processing and export and/or on
consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy-intensive products; and land-locked and transit countries, see
the Convention, Art. 4(8)-(10).
34 Note that Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol and Annex I to the Climate Convention are not entirely identical.
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Other important products of the Protocol are the flexibility mechanisms, the basic provisions
in fulfilling the emission reduction obligations set out in the Protocol. These mechanisms are
emissions trading (ET)35, joint implementation (JI)36, and the clean development mechanism
(CDM)37. In addition to the basic provisions in the Protocol, the Conference of the Parties
serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol has adopted more detailed rules
concerning the mechanisms.38
Emissions trading, based on Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, refers to inter-state trading of
emission units. Each state has been given a right to a certain amount of emissions, the assigned
amount, consisting of assigned amount units (AAU). This at the same time means an
obligation to reduce those emissions with a certain amount with respect to the 1990 emission
levels39. If a state reduces its emissions more than required, it may sell the remaining part, or
parts thereof, of its assigned amount to another state. Also the other two mechanisms create
special emission units, JI emission reduction units (ERU) and CDM certified emission
reductions (CER) that can be traded. Finally, also removal units (RMU), that indicate the
amount of carbon sink that a state may use to fulfil its commitments, may be traded.40
Joint implementation, based on Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, entails a possibility for a
developed state (Annex I state) to invest in e.g. cleaner technology projects or modernisation
projects of industrial installations in another developed state. The emission reduction would
thus take place in the state hosting the project, and the host country would then transfer the
resulting “emission reduction units” to the investing Annex I state. In practice, it has been
perceived that such projects are most likely to take place in states with economies in transition,
i.e. former socialist states.
35 Kyoto Protocol, Article 17.
36 Kyoto Protocol, Article 6.
37 Kyoto Protocol, Article 12.
38 See decisions 2/CMP.1, 3/CMP.1, 4/CMP.1, 5/CMP.1, 6/CMP.1, 7/CMP.1, 9/CMP.1, 10/CMP.1, 11/CMP.1.
39 There is an obligation to reduce emissions if the assigned amount is smaller than the 1990 emissions. The
assigned amount is also in some cases equal to or bigger than the 1990 emissions for economic or development
reasons.
40 For definitions of the different emission units, see decisions 3/CMP.1, Annex, para. 1; 9/CMP.1, Annex, para.
1; 11/CMP.1, Annex, para. 1; 13/CMP.1, Annex,  paras. 1-4.
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The clean development mechanism based on Article 12 of the Protocol functions to a great
deal in a similar manner as joint implementation, by means of investments in projects, but
there the host country that receives the investment is a developing country that so far does not
have emission reduction obligations. The purpose of the CDM is to assist non-Annex I states
in achieving sustainable development and Annex I states in fulfilling their obligations under
the Protocol.
2.2 International Law and International Environmental Law – an Overview of a Process of
Deformalisation
2.2.1 Fragmentation
International law has sometimes been seen to be, typically for the post-modern era of law41, in
a process of fragmentation. Indeed, the number of norms of international law has been seen as
having gone through an expansion during the past few decades and taken to cover an ever
greater range of activities with increasing specificity. This has led to international law
breaking into specialised subsystems.42 Behind this process is another process, that of
globalisation with its different, technically specialised co-operation networks that have a
global scope: trade, environment, human rights, communication and so on. These are spheres
of life and expert co-operation that transgress national boundaries and are difficult to regulate
through traditional international law any more than through national laws.43
Also the number of competent actors has increased and there has been an attempt to improve
the efficiency of the enforcement of international law obligations by setting up different
“follow-up” systems and organizations.44 Accordingly, demands have been imposed upon
41 See Kuokkanen 2002 p. 236.
42 Sands 2000 p. 548.
43 Koskenniemi 2006 para. 481; see Slaughter 2000 passim. A similar tendency towards specialisation has been
perceived within legal scholarship. The interest towards general, all-encompassing theory of international law has
subsided, as it has been seen as being founded on invalid assumptions, and the interest has been replaced by the
analysis of certain specific sectors of international law, such as international environmental law, see Shaw 2003
p. 61.
44 See Hafner 2000 p. 329, according to whom this type of organization is especially typical within the field of
international environmental law, among a few others; Higgins 2001 p. 121. The increase in the number of
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43 Koskenniemi 2006 para. 481; see Slaughter 2000 passim. A similar tendency towards specialisation has been
perceived within legal scholarship. The interest towards general, all-encompassing theory of international law has
subsided, as it has been seen as being founded on invalid assumptions, and the interest has been replaced by the
analysis of certain specific sectors of international law, such as international environmental law, see Shaw 2003
p. 61.
44 See Hafner 2000 p. 329, according to whom this type of organization is especially typical within the field of
international environmental law, among a few others; Higgins 2001 p. 121. The increase in the number of
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international law to serve certain special interests, such as international trade, human rights or
environmental protection.
Behind this phenomenon there has been seen to be a change in the operational principles of the
international system. Recently all activity has been perceived to be based on informal relations
between different actors, whereas the role of the state has turned from legislator into a
facilitator and enabler of different self-regulating systems. As a consequence international and
national are not always separable even in politics or administration.45
This has resulted in the emergence of special regimes of international law that have their basis
in multilateral treaties and acts of international organisations. Specialized treaties and
customary patterns that are tailored to the needs and interests of each network are a
manifestation of the phenomenon.46 The nature of international law as a coherent discipline
has been seen to be threatened by this division into objective-oriented branches.47
Fragmentation entails theoretical, doctrinal as well as practical problems, such as what to do in
a situation of a conflict of laws, how to fill in gaps in the law, or how to concretise a vague
and open-ended rule in a concrete situation48. Also the established division of law into
specialised fields is being rethought. Do the emerging specialised fields of international law
have the qualities that would make them independent fields of law in their own right? What
about international environmental law? Should these qualities be developed? And what kind of
an impact does this have on practical legal problem solving? It also seems to me that the
independence is not an either-or –issue, but rather a more-or-less –issue.49
competent actors is evidenced by e.g. the Kyoto Protocol flexibility mechanisms, where the participation of legal
entities is made possible by means of state authorisation, and as for the project based mechanisms JI and CDM by
granting an institutionalised position to certain legal entities (the Designated Operational Entities and the
Accredited Independent Entities).
45 Koskenniemi & Leino 2002 p. 557; Higgins 2001 p. 121.
46 See Koskenniemi 2006 para. 482.
47 See e.g. Koskenniemi & Leino 2002 p. 560.
48 See Sands 2000 p. 549.
49 Answering these questions in this study is necessary, as it provides some justification to the formation of the
research questions as well as the choice – and use – of principles by locating the study in the wider context of
law, and settles the question concerning the applicability of the general doctrine of international law.
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It has also been suggested that even though the diversification of international law may
threaten its coherence, it also increases its responsiveness to the regulatory context.50
Specialisation allows the regime to take the specific characteristics of the problem that needs
to be tackled into account. It is easy to imagine that the conservation of biological diversity
calls for a different approach than, say, military conflicts. Besides this, the law of treaties
provides a counterbalance by requiring that specific norms must be read against other relevant
norms, “in a mutually supportive light”51, also known as the principle of integration.52
The emergence of new judicial organs that apply general international law from a specific
point of view, with their own specific interests and biases, has been seen as part of the
problem of fragmentation53. Several new tribunals that focus on certain specific questions of
international law have been created. An example of such a court is the International Tribunal
on the Law of the Sea, based in Hamburg, Germany.54 It has been perceived that this
proliferation of international tribunals committed to their own sets of rules might lead to
forum-shopping55. It may, furthermore, constitute a threat to the coherence of international law
and, thus, also its role in inter-state relations56 by leading to excess specialisation and the
confinement of those making legal decisions to their narrow sectors57. Yet another
50 Koskenniemi 2006 paras. 492-493.
51 But cf. Koskenniemi 2006 para. 280, who views the issue of “mutually supportive” interpretation in a critical
light.
52 See Vienna Convention Art. 31(3)(c); see also Simma & Pulkowski 2006 p. 492. For case law, see United
States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, (WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 April 1996), Section III B;
Korea – Measures Affecting Government Procurement, (WT/DS163/R, 19 June 2000), at paras. 7.93-7.96; Oil
Platforms Case (Iran v. United States of America) (Merits) ICJ Reports 2003, para. 40. See also Koskenniemi
2006 paras. 416-419: “This points to the need to carry out the interpretation so as to see the rules in view of some
comprehensible and coherent objective, to prioritize concerns that are more important at the cost of less important
objectives”.
53 See Koskenniemi 2007 p. 5, according to whom “the point of the emergence of something like ‘international
criminal law’ or ‘international human rights law’ (or any other special law) is precisely to institutionalise the new
priorities carried within such fields. As a result, political conflict will often take the form of conflict of
jurisdictions”; see also Sands 2000 p. 394 briefly on institutional fragmentation, in addition to which he sees the
absence of an “appropriately effective and sufficiently financed central institution”.
54 The International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea was set up by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and its Charter is in Annex VI of the Convention. The Court’s decisions are legally
binding, see Hakapää 2003 pp. 487-488. A special chamber to deal with environmental matters was also set up in
the International Court of Justice, see Higgins 2001 p. 122; see also Birnie & Boyle 2002 p. 224.
55 Koskenniemi & Leino 2002 pp. 554-556; see also Hafner 2000 p. 332.
56 See Koskenniemi & Leino 2002 pp. 555-560.
57 Hafner 2000 p. 326; Oellers-Frahm 2001 p. 74.
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consequence may be that the recognition of rights and obligations of legal subjects depend on
which body is seized to recognise them.58
On the other hand, the fragmentation of international judicial functions has also been seen to
have positive ramifications. According to J.I. Charney the situation allows certain
experimentation, which may lead to improvements in international law. Hence, alternative fora
complement the work done by the International Court of Justice, while strengthening
international law by offering means of enforcement to back up legal obligations, even if
diminish the coherence of international law59. Possible downsides have been seen to be
avoidable.60 A strictly hierarchical system might, on the other hand, hamper the development
of the law in the absence of a possibility for the above mentioned experimentation, whereas a
more pluralistic system offers a possibility to bring forward new thoughts, and to evaluate
them within the international community.61
In addition to the obvious danger of conflicting interpretations or jurisdictions, the
fragmentation of international judicial functions may be problematic due to the fact that a case
under consideration in a tribunal rarely concerns only one field of law – e.g. international trade
or the environment62 – and that, thus, other fields and aspects must be taken into account, such
as the law of treaties, state responsibility or state succession. Still, the primary cause of
existence of the organization may turn out to be the decisive factor, under which the tribunal
or some other judicial body making the decision functions.63
58 Koskenniemi & Leino 2002 p. 561; Koskenniemi 2006 para. 489; see also Forster 2003 passim on the
illustrative MOX Case, and decision on provisional measures reached by the International Tribunal on the Law of
the Sea, the MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom) ITLOS 2001 No. 10.
59 See also Koskenniemi & Leino 2002 pp. 565-567.
60 Hey 2000 p. 10; see also Abi-Saab 1999 pp. 925-926.
61 See Charney 1998 pp. 347-348; see also Abi-Saab 1999 p. 925, according to whom “complexification creates a
need for specialized tribunals to accommodate normative diversification and specialization”, although “this
requires, in turn, a certain coordination or harmonization between the diverse tribunals; in other words, their
correlation into a kind of constellation, however loose it may be” – a constellation that, as Abi-Saab himself
concludes, is not possible within the current system of international law. Also concerning the fragmentation of
judicial functions, more specifically the limitations on jurisdiction on one hand and on the applicable law on the
other, see Koskenniemi 2006 paras. 44-45.
62 See e.g. Voigt 2006.
63 See Birnie & Boyle 2002 p. 224; Gab ikovo-Nagymaros Project Case (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, ICJ Rep.
(1997) p. 7. This preference is also known as structural bias, and it is discussed briefly later in this text.
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An equivalent problem is built into environmental treaties, where the supreme goal is
sustainable development. This goal brings along considerations of international development
law and the integration of environmental and development concerns. Environmental
considerations will increasingly become a feature of economic policy, and vice versa. This has
been justified by the assumed improved effectiveness of environmental regulations, although
also critical views have been presented.64 Human rights and international trade interests may
need attention due to references to e.g. international trade or indigenous peoples.65 The
purpose of existence and the goals of the subsystem in question – “the object and purpose of
the treaty” according to the Vienna Convention Article 31(1) – may, however, constitute the
primary basis of interpretation, an example of which is the goal of the
WTO to promote free trade66.
Also general international law must be taken into account and applied when making decisions
under a particular subsystem of international law, such as international environmental law or
human rights – at least to the extent that the application has not been excluded in the rules of
the subsystem itself. This is the case within e.g. the WTO system. According to Koskenniemi
– Leino it has become regular practice with the WTO panels and the Appellate Body to refer
to Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as well as to the
relevant jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice.67
64 See Sands 2000 p. 400; Pallemaerts 1993 pp. 16-19, who criticises the integration of environmental protection
and development concerns: “The new discourse of ‘integration’ suggests that there is no longer any conflict
between environmental protection and economic development, and that the latter has become a necessary
complement, condition even, of the former”; see also Kuokkanen 2002 p. 299.
65 Hey 2000 pp. 4-5.
66 See e.g. Cameron & Gray 2001 p. 251; see also United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products (WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998) para. 114. One of the objectives of the WTO treaty,
however, is sustainable development, on this see the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation,
Preamble, and e.g. United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (WT/DS58/AB/R,
12 October 1998) para. 129. On possible conflicts between WTO law and climate change mitigation measures,
see Voigt 2006.
67 See Koskenniemi – Leino 2002 p. 571; Charney 1998 pp. 145-153, and the case-law discussed therein; see also
e.g. United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 April 1996) Part
III B, where the Appellate Body has stated e.g. that the WTO agreements should not be read “in clinical isolation
from public international law”; see also Human Rights Committee: General Comment, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6,
reproduced in 34 ILM 839 (1995) para. 6. The definition of general international law used here is that used by
inter alia Kelsen, see Kelsen 1966 p. 18; on the concept of “general international law” see also Koskenniemi
2004 para. 192; Melkas 2007a.
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An interpretative effect of general international law could be possible even beyond the point of
exclusion. As the different issues and situations that arise can often be legally characterised
and systematised in several different ways – not to mention counted as being included in the
competence of several institutions and authorities – the total exclusion of the application of
general international law within one treaty regime would seem arbitrary. A treaty regime
cannot contain answers to every problem that may arise within the regime.68 Instead,
interpretative guidance provided by general international law could entail certain predictability
to the regime.
2.2.2 Environmental law – an Intersecting Discipline and a Source of Influence
Environmental law is a field of law that is interested in norms regulating the relations between
humans and their environment. It is a young discipline – it has become a discipline of its own
during the 1970’s in most of the western world and only after that also elsewhere. Its material
limitation still varies from one country to another.69
Features typical to environmental law are e.g. its objective-orientation and its problem-
orientation. The starting point for environmental regulation is normally in environmental
problems or problems concerning the relations between humans and the environment. It is an
instrument with which the society furthers its interests, such as a clean environment or the
health of its citizens.70 This is one reason why connections between environmental law and
other fields of law are necessary – to steer activities in order to achieve the stipulated
68 See also Koskenniemi 2006 para. 492, according to whom “even as international law’s diversification may
threaten its coherence, it does this by increasing its responsiveness to the regulatory context.  Fragmentation
moves international law in the direction of legal pluralism but does this …  by constantly using the resources of
general international law, especially the rules of the VCLT, customary law and ‘general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations’”.
69 Vihervuori 1995 p. 757.
70 Also environmental problems are problems concerning the relations between humans and the environment, but
the latter concept is wider. This regulatory approach has not, however, always been the prevailing one. To begin
with, the aim of preserving the environment was connected with, even based on, the need to protect the legal
position and interests of others. Examples of this are at the domestic level in Finland the old land use and water
law that was mainly concerned with the use of real property, and at the international level the no harm principle
that entailed a prohibition to cause (environmental) harm to other states, the prime example of which is the Trail
Smelter Arbitration. But nowadays the intrinsic value of the environment is recognised; hence, the prevailing
regulatory approach is the one described above, see Hollo 1991 p. 6. See also Ranta 2001 pp. 8-9.
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objectives one will need instruments or other means which will usually be products of other
fields of law71. This is also the reason why environmentally significant provisions may be
found in legislation or treaties not generally thought of as “environmental”, e.g. international
trade law.
Objective-orientation is shown by, in addition to the fact that environmental law aims at
protecting the environment, the fact that environmental law is meant to balance between the
environmental goals provided for in the applicable legislation or international law on one hand
and the interests to use natural resources or change or burden the environment on the other.72
The best examples of the tension between environmental and other societal interests are
provided by the numerous decisions of the WTO dispute settlement organs, also cited in this
text.
Environmental law has also been described as the law of conflicts. It has been seen that
conflicts between different actors and balancing between different interests are particularly
characteristic to environmental law73. Thus, environmental law does not aim at prioritizing
environmental protection above everything else, but finding a suitable balance between
different interests.74 Economic aspects are often in these conflicts the counterbalance to
environmental interests.
In addition to these, a multidisciplinary basis is characteristic to environmental law. This
refers to its connections with different (other) environmental sciences.75 The effect that
environmental problems have on human settlements, the fact that environmental problems
largely have their background in human activities, and the fact that nature and the environment
are nowadays seen to have an intrinsic value of their own to be taken into account, a societal
response to these problems has been perceived as necessary. Furthermore, in addition to
71 See also Ranta 2001 p. 12.
72 Ekroos et al. 2002 pp. 6-7; Hollo 1991 p. 7. An equivalent to the fragmentation discussion in international law
has taken place also domestically in Finland. Environmental law has sometimes been perceived as a typical
product of such a development, together with a few other disciplines, see Nuotio 2002 p. 20, on objective-
orientation in law generally.
73 See e.g. de Sadeleer 2002 p. 297; Hollo 1991 pp. 6-7.
74 Ekroos et al. 2002 p. 6. The idea of integration between environmental protection and development (or
economic) concerns brought up above suggests the contrary, that there is no longer a conflict between these
different interests, see criticism against this idea by Pallemaerts 1993 pp. 16-19.
75 See also Kumpula 2004 p. 235.
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has taken place also domestically in Finland. Environmental law has sometimes been perceived as a typical
product of such a development, together with a few other disciplines, see Nuotio 2002 p. 20, on objective-
orientation in law generally.
73 See e.g. de Sadeleer 2002 p. 297; Hollo 1991 pp. 6-7.
74 Ekroos et al. 2002 p. 6. The idea of integration between environmental protection and development (or
economic) concerns brought up above suggests the contrary, that there is no longer a conflict between these
different interests, see criticism against this idea by Pallemaerts 1993 pp. 16-19.
75 See also Kumpula 2004 p. 235.
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environmental problems’ background in human activities, also the societal significance of
those problems is determined in societal processes.76 This makes the multidisciplinarity of
environmental problems as well as environmental policy and law especially concrete and
visible.
The existence of an international environmental law as an independent discipline has often
been called into question. It has generally been perceived that the international law concerning
the environment still relies on the principles and sources of general international law. In other
words international environmental law should be thought of as a part of international law.77
This view, although partly correct, however ignores the bigger picture. “International
environmental law” surely refers to the application of international law to environmental
problems. But environmental problems and the legal responses thereto indeed have posed
significant challenges to international law – a good example is provided by the traditional
dispute settlement mechanisms, that have been partly replaced by non-compliance procedures
in different environmental regimes. For example, causality between behaviour and
environmental degradation is often difficult to establish precisely enough to satisfy the
demands of the law. Rules on standing may be inflexible or insufficient. Status quo ante can
not be restored, even if responsibility for the damage has been established. The applicable
standards are too indeterminate to be enforced by traditional means. At a more general level, it
is often not the states that pollute, but actors within them, but traditionally international law
has been seen to be unable to deal with these other entities.78
The role of principles within international environmental law gives international
environmental law certain particularity in relation to international law. At least in the Finnish
discussion there seems to be a consensus that the recognised general doctrine of a discipline is
76 See Kumpula & Määttä 2002 p. 209.
77 See Birnie & Boyle 2002 pp. 1-3; on the discussion see also a slightly different view by Kuokkanen 2002 pp.
356-357. Similar lines of thinking can be found in the field of human rights, see e.g. Human Rights Committee:
General Comment, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, reproduced in 34 ILM 839 (1995) para. 17, where it is pointed out
that “it is the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that provides the definition of reservations and also the
application of the object and purpose test in the absence of other specific provisions. But the Committee believes
that its provisions on the role of State objections in relation to reservations are inappropriate to address the
problem of reservations to human rights treaties.”
78 See Klabbers 2007 pp. 1001-1003.
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the source of the particular identity of that discipline79. A particular, defined subject of
regulation, say the use of the environment, is, thus, not sufficient. The legal concepts
structuring the subject of regulation and principles providing the normative bases for it are still
needed.80
These concepts may serve several different functions, according to Tuori. They may condense
the normative contents of the law, they may describe the interaction between legal norms and
their object of application in the society, or they may structure the object of regulation of the
legal norms.81 Tuori’s discussion focuses on the national legal system, not international law.
Some guidance may, however, be sought from it also in this discussion. It seems appropriate
to conclude that the general doctrine applicable in international environmental law is largely
that of international law. Concepts and principles such as state sovereignty, sovereign equality
and equity support this conclusion.
This being said it must be kept in mind that there are concepts and principles particular to
international environmental law, or environmental law, too, such as sustainable development
or the precautionary principle – although the concepts and principles may not always be
particular to environmental law only, but be shared between two or more legal disciplines.82
Their particularity, regardless of this multidisciplinarity of one kind, lies in the fact that they
do not seem to have been granted a general application in law, domestic or international, but
within specific fields.
International environmental law does have characteristics that makes it differ from other fields
of international law much in the same way as domestic environmental law differs from, say,
domestic labour law. This is to say that – to return to the nature of the independence of a legal
79 See e.g. Nuotio 2002 p. 3; Tuori 2002 pp. 169-172.
80 See Tuori 2004 pp. 1203, 1216; Määttä 1999 p. 41, see also p. 458, where Määttä points out that legal
scholarship cannot ”hide behind the backs of the legislator or the courts”, but rather take part in the discourse by
recognising and articulating the principles. This would, according to Määttä rather be the task of legal scholarship
than that of the legislator or the courts.
81 See Tuori 2004 pp. 1216-1218.
82 See also Sands 2000 pp. 372-373; Nollkaemper 1996 p. 80, who even finds that “ideally, international
environmental law should be a principled system of rules, with specific obligations being based on and consistent
with underlying principles”. Sustainable development and the precautionary principle are examples of principles
shared by two or more legal disciplines, as sustainable development has a development side to it as well, and the
precautionary principle is frequently invoked within the field of foodstuffs policy.
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discipline as a more-or-less issue – environmental law does have some characteristics that
separate it from general international law (such as extensive reliance on principles and flexible
standards). But general international law is still relied on as to such crucial features as validity
and subjects, for example. Thus, a distinct character seems difficult to ignore, but this does not
mean total independence. To claim that it would be would be equally preposterous as to claim
that domestic environmental law is not part of domestic/national law.
2.2.3 Principles and International Environmental Law
Principles have been the object of great interest within environmental law – both national and
international. They characterise many of the instruments adopted within the past few decades,
binding treaties as well as soft law instruments such as the Stockholm and Rio Declarations.
Principles have been introduced into many national legal systems after having been adopted at
the international level. International environmental treaties may even contain a separate article
concerning principles, and e.g. the EC Treaty makes several environmental principles binding
upon the Member States83. This has necessitated the transposition of these principles into
national legal systems.84 The traffic on this road between international and national is,
however, two-way. Principles have also been brought to international environmental treaties
as an influence by national legal systems.85 In international legal literature a reference to
municipal legal systems as sources of the general principles of international law is often
made.86
Environmental law is particularly attractive a discipline for the introduction of such open legal
standards as principles. It is objective-oriented (it aims at protecting the environment), there is
often a significant amount of uncertainty involved concerning the problems that require
83 See e.g. Climate Convention, Article 3; UNCLOS, Article 5; Convention on the Protection of the Baltic Sea
Area, Article 3; Treaty Establishing the European Community, Article 174(2).
84 Nowadays most of e.g. Finnish domestic environmental legislation is guided by the principle of sustainable
development, and many of the other internationally accepted environmental principles have been adopted, see
e.g. Section 1 of the Environmental Protection Act (86/2000), Section 1 of the Nature Protection Act
(1096/1996), and Section 1 of the Planning and Building Act (132/1999).
85 Ranta 2001 p. 123.
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response, and the questions often touch upon some crucial interests of states (or other
addressees of the regulation).
In the case of international environmental law the role of principles is especially established
due to their firm position as one of the sources of international law. Article 38 of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice, which is usually referred to as a list of the established
sources of international law, mentions international conventions, international custom, the
general principles of law, and judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, the last one of which is a subsidiary source.87
The term general principles of international law refers to the guidelines and principles steering
the legally relevant international activities of states.88 These principles have also been seen as
forming the basis of a “substantial body of international law”.89 These general principles
referred to in the Statute of the International Court of Justice have, however, often been seen
as representing something different from the principles discussed and developed within the
current international environmental law. The reliance has been primarily on the view
according to which general principles of law are derived from “general principles common to
the major legal systems of the world”.90
87 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38; Hakapää 2003 p. 21; see also Birnie & Boyle 2002 pp.
11, 23; Hakapää 2003 pp. 59-62; Shaw 2003 p. 66; Hollo & Parkkari 1994 p. 17. It seems clear that an exhaustive
list of this kind cannot serve as an entirely satisfactory description of the sources available. Material comparable
to the traditional sources just mentioned has been created in the decision making processes of international –
intergovernmental – organizations, such as decisions, resolutions, declarations etc. Some of these are binding
law, but most of them merely declaratory. Even non-binding documents may, however, have an influence on the
development of international law de lege ferenda. Ross 1946 p. 105 criticises this for basing the sources doctrine
on a provision in one of the sources. For a discussion on the distinction between general principles of law and the
general principles of international law, see Voigt 2006 pp. 199-201.
88 Hakapää 2003 p. 54; see also Shaw 2003 pp. 92-103, who lists some established principles and their
application by the International Court of Justice.
89 See Lauterpacht 1970 p. 114, according to whom “the universality of a substantial body of international law” is
due to this; see also Cheng 1987 p. 4, who points out that there has been disagreement among commentators
concerning the grounds for perceiving the general principles as part of the international legal order – as to
whether this is due to the fact that the international legal order is indeed a legal order, and general principles
necessarily form part of any legal system, hence also of international law, or whether there is a rule of customary
international law according to which such principles are applicable in international relations.
90 See e.g. Cameron & Abouchar 1996 pp. 32-33, who refer to the American Law Institute Restatement (Third)
on International Law, according to which “a rule of international law is one that has been accepted as such by the
international community of states [… ] by derivation from general principles common to the major legal systems
of the world”; Lauterpacht 1970 pp. 74, 77 according to whom “the formulation of Article 38 of the Statute [… ]
emphasises their pragmatic and inductive character inasmuch as they are derived from systems of law actually in
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A different approach, less rigid as such in my view, has been adopted by Brownlie, according
to whom the expression “general principles of international law” may refer to “rules of
customary law, to general principles of law as in Article 38(1)(c), or to logical propositions
resulting from judicial reasoning on the basis of existing international law and municipal
analogies”. He goes on to state that a rigid categorisation of sources is inappropriate.91
The principles discussed here are what de Sadeleer calls directing principles, as opposed to
general principles of law or general principles of international law. This difference between
directing principles and the “general principles of international law” marks, according to de
Sadeleer, the shift from modern to post-modern model of law. The break is not complete, but
rather the difference is one of gradation, as the value basis is, in the end, the same.92 But the
role played by principles shifts the focus of law from the modern model of law, where
solutions to an infinite number of cases may be deduced from a legal norm to other types of
reasoning which seek to balance interests by applying directing principles set out in legislative
instruments.93 This more discursive and co-operative approach to law has been seen as having
replaced the classical legal imperative, the command-and-control approach.94
There does not seem, however, to be reason to treat the principles typical to post-modern law,
addressed by de Sadeleer, and the general principles referred to by the Statute of the ICJ as
fundamentally different. The post-modern principles are typically to a great extent objective-
oriented and specific to different subsystems of law, such as environmental law, whereas the
modern principles – such as pacta sunt servanda, audiatur et altera pars or res judicata – are,
indeed, more general.95
operation as distinguished from the speculative and philosophical aspects of the classical law of nature”; Ross
1946 pp. 114-115; Shaw 2003 pp. 93-94.
91 See Brownlie 2003 pp. 18-19.
92 See de Sadeleer 2002 p. 229. See e.g. Hakapää 2003 pp. 53-55 on the general principles of law as a source of
international law.
93 See de Sadeleer 2002 p. 230.
94 See de Sadeleer 2002 pp. 246-247.
95 See de Sadeleer 2002 pp. 229-230.
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These principles often serve to promote certain public policy objectives, and thus, represent a
substantive approach to law, as opposed to a formal one96. According to de Sadeleer, in
modern law the main task of the general principles of law has been to ensure the coherence of
law, inter alia to fulfil gaps in law.97 It is, however, justified to conclude that this task has not
disappeared along the introduction of the new post-modern principles, although the function of
principles as tools for different policy objectives has been brought more to the fore. The task
seems to be more confined to the field of environmental law, but it is still there. In fact,
according to de Sadeleer, “the autonomy and coherence suitable for a new legal discipline thus
go together with the affirmation of fitting directing principles” – the existence, recognition and
affirmation of principles are necessary for a new legal discipline.98 Indeed, it seems that in
post-modern law coherence is “local”, i.e. confined to each legal discipline, and not “total”,
the coherence of the entire legal system99.
96 See also Sands 1995 pp. 184-185. General principles of law have sometimes, in earlier discourses, even been
accused of resembling natural law, see the discussion in Cheng 1987 pp. 14-17. Formalism expressed in e.g.
positivism and the rule of law on the one hand and its opposite expressed in substantive standards and recognition
of the value basis of the law on the other seem to take turns in law. Modernity brought the unformulated law (e.g.
principles) to supplement, balance and even correct other positive law – still, even if unformulated, this law may
indeed be positive. See also Graver 1989 pp. 69-70, who points out similarly concerning the norms of the welfare
state (in an earlier phase of the development of the law) that they have the function of securing external,
substantive goals.
97 See de Sadeleer 2002 pp. 233-234, 239-243; see also Kumpula 2004 p. 235. According to Shaw 2003 p. 93,
this was the reason for the inclusion of general principles in the list of sources of international law that the ICJ
shall apply in Art. 38 of the Statute of the ICJ. The argument about principles ensuring the coherence of the legal
system has been viewed critically by Koskenniemi 2005a p. 62, as “indeterminacy follows as a structural
property of the international legal language itself. It is not an externally introduced distortion”; see also
Koskenniemi 2006 para. 491, who points out that “no added value is brought by the fact of its [a legal system’s]
being coherently so [unjust and unworkable]. Therefore, alongside coherence, pluralism should be understood as
a constitutive value of the system.” For a discussion dating back to the modern era, see e.g. Lauterpacht 1970 pp.
68-69. Coherence has sometimes been addressed also in the discussion concerning regimes within political
theory, i.e. coherence within regimes, see Young 1989 p. 25.
98 De Sadeleer also recognises the need for coherence within environmental law, especially in international
environmental law: “Law-making is decentralized, and the absence of adequate co-ordination between various
initiatives taken at the global, regional, and sub-regional levels often results in measures that are duplicative, and
sometimes even inconsistent”; see also Sands 2000 pp. 387-394, according to whom this duplication would be
possible to avoid by means of an institutional reform within international law. Particularly problematic is the
nature of international environmental law, “which has proceeded incrementally and in a piecemeal fashion”. See
also de Sadeleer 2002 pp. 258-259, 264, who recognizes the function of also post-modern law principles as the
providers of coherence; Kumpula 2004 p. 235, according to whom the functions of environmental principles as
part of the general doctrine of environmental law and as means to locate environmental law as a discipline of its
own are emphasised by the definition of principles. See also Tuori 2004 pp. 1219-1224 who speaks of local
coherence.
99 See Tuori 2004 p. 1211; see also European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones) (WT/DS26/AB/R, 13 February 1998), Part VI; Koskenniemi 2006 paras. 55, 129.
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nature of international environmental law, “which has proceeded incrementally and in a piecemeal fashion”. See
also de Sadeleer 2002 pp. 258-259, 264, who recognizes the function of also post-modern law principles as the
providers of coherence; Kumpula 2004 p. 235, according to whom the functions of environmental principles as
part of the general doctrine of environmental law and as means to locate environmental law as a discipline of its
own are emphasised by the definition of principles. See also Tuori 2004 pp. 1219-1224 who speaks of local
coherence.
99 See Tuori 2004 p. 1211; see also European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones) (WT/DS26/AB/R, 13 February 1998), Part VI; Koskenniemi 2006 paras. 55, 129.
29
30
The coherence function could be relevant within international law as well, in the state of
fragmentation discussed above. Principles could aid in “reading norms against other relevant
norms in a mutually supportive light”100 by providing a framework and guidelines for
interpretation. But when it comes to post-modern principles, their most significant
characteristic is that they promote certain values and morality that are seen as prevailing in the
society, or worthy of promotion. They are not value-neutral – instead, the basis of their
validity is material, and they set material requirements to the end-result of legal decision-
making.101
Furthermore, principles serve to “weaken confrontation and conflict, and harmonise national
and supranational legislation”. They make the compatibility of different legal systems
possible, and create links and connections between different parts of these systems and
between different systems, and in this way ensure the effectiveness of the law.102 They also
create possibilities for the existence of different values and perceptions by providing flexibility
necessary for the balancing of different interests and following the developments in the
society, as regards e.g. the use of the environment103. Thus, first, they open up possibilities for
a more pluralistic law, and second, they open law and its interpretation to their factual context,
i.e. non-legal factors, and eventually casuistry104 – as the relevant facts vary from one case to
another. On the other hand, they also limit the options available to the interpreter105.
At a more practical level, the use of principles may be justified by their function as promoters
of compromise. In a field of law of the kind of environmental law, where it is particularly
difficult to agree upon precise rules at the international level, “it is far easier to come to a
public understanding about indefinite principles that can progressively be given more concrete
100 See Peel 2002 pp. 53-78. But cf. Koskenniemi 2006 paras. 416-419 – this presumes the acceptance of some
degree of instrumentalism, as interpretation “in a mutually supportive light” assumes an accepted purpose to the
instrument. It also entails managerialism and decision making in casu. This approach has been criticised by, inter
alia, Koskenniemi 2006 para. 280.
101 See Tolonen 1988 pp. 187-190; Ranta 2001 p. 127.
102 See also Kumpula 2004 p. 238.
103 Kumpula 2004 p. 238; Ranta 2001 pp. 131-132; see also Nollkaemper 1996 pp. 81-88.
104 See e.g. Nollkaemper 1996 p. 82, who points out in his discussion concerning the precautionary principle, that
“the discretion left by the threshold is so great that as a practical matter it may be difficult to assess whether a
state’s determination that a threshold is or is not crossed is a purely scientific affair or involves some
consideration of costs. It is this discretion that may undermine the objective of precaution”.
105 See Ranta 2001 p. 156.
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form”.106 In addition to this, the complexity of environmental issues in both social (acceptance
of risks by populations) as well as scientific terms (the emergence of a new generation of
environmental and ecological risks) has contributed to the demand for more open concepts.107
Thus, by means of principles and the flexibility they entail it is easier to find agreement
between different interest groups, than by means of more precise rules.108 Hence, principles
have come to occupy a significant role in environmental legal argumentation.
In addition many principles bring a reflection of the value basis underlying the law, and thus,
emphasise the necessary connection between law and morality.109 Often the precept provided
by a principle rests upon an idea of justice110, and, according to Kuusiniemi, the most
significant ground for its validity is general acceptability, its legitimacy.111
As the value basis of the law, as well as perceptions of justice, change more slowly than legal
rules, principles are a relatively long-lasting, and hence stabilising, element in the legal
system112. In addition to this, principles have a significant interpretative role. It is common
knowledge that rules can never be written in such a manner that one could always, in every
situation, find an applicable rule without interpretation. Principles may serve to limit this
interpretative discretion. Consequently, principles may improve legal certainty and
predictability through guidance and steering of decision making.113
106 De Sadeleer 2002 p. 1; see also Kumpula 2004 p. 238. But cf. Kelman 1987 p. 41, who, however, speaks of
standards, one type of which, it may be assumed, principles are, see also p. 3. Kelman also points out the
criticism concerning the problem of rules applied to a fixed social situation, implying that the social situation will
not stay fixed once the rules are in place, but that unjust outcomes will occur more often because people will try
to arrange their affairs so that they are favoured by the rules, see Kelman 1987 p. 41.
107 See de Sadeleer 2002 p. 4.
108 See de Sadeleer 2002 p. 259; Lauterpacht 1970 pp. 46-47. The same has been said about soft law, see e.g. Kiss
& Shelton 2000 p. 52.
109 See also Kuusiniemi 1992b pp. 136-142; Ranta 2001 p. 150; but cf. Maus 1989 p. 155, according to whom in
legal practice principles rarely have the moral intention ascribed to them in legal theory; instead, they are
identical to the principles of the administrative state. Thus, even if the development, where moral grounds are
increasingly taking the place of democratic legitimacy, occasionally leads to corrections of political democratic
processes which accommodate moral-jurisprudential intentions, it does not offset the loss of democratic control
functions. On morality within legal scholarship, see e.g. Nuotio 2002 pp. 15-16.
110 See Kuusiniemi 1992b p. 139.
111 See Kuusiniemi 1992b pp. 140-141; Dworkin 1977 p. 22; see also Cassese 2005 p. 48.
112 See Kuusiniemi 1992b pp. 140-141.
113 See also Ranta 2001 pp. 150-151; Nollkaemper 1996 p. 80. See also Kelman 1987 pp. 43-44, who discusses
the “pros” and “cons” of standards vis-à-vis rules.
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As opposed to this, employing a principle, such as sustainable development, in a treaty as a
substantive requirement, or basing substantive obligations on principles may indeed turn out to
be problematic due to the generality of principles. There are countless ways to interpret e.g.
sustainable development in a concrete problem, depending on the interpreter’s convictions and
biases. Rather, the principles employed should be operationalised by turning them into
concrete requirements and rules especially in implementing treaties and implementing
instruments at the national level. This applies in particular to sustainable development, which
is especially difficult to define – but also to other principles, although their role as guidelines
steering interpretation and limiting the latitude for discretion cannot be underestimated
either.114 Thus, instead of sustainable development, the treaty or the parliamentary act could
include provisions on e.g. an environmental impact assessment115.
This does not only refer to national legislators, but must also be seen to mean the international
community of states at the international level. And when the law-maker proclaims principles
he is also addressing the subordinate administrations – principles will serve as guides and
signals for the use of discretionary powers by administrative authorities.116 As for legal
certainty, in a post-modern model of law principles are elements that rather stabilise than
perturb the legal system by providing general goals and guidelines for individual decisions,
whether regulatory, legislative or other.117
De Sadeleer claims that principles declared in soft-law instruments cannot be placed in the
same category with normative principles, as soft law is not legally binding per se.
Furthermore, as their formulation is imprecise, they cannot serve a similar role as normative
principles at the substantive level. They mainly have interpretative value. They may, however,
serve as forerunners of treaty law, and in this way, implicitly, contribute to the creation of new
114 See de Sadeleer 2002 p. 269, who has considered it necessary to adopt specific implementing laws. This is
indeed a possibility, but even more effective would probably be to follow the principles in writing actual
substantive rights and obligations – after all, interpretative choices are made also in this process. See also Haila
1991 p. 60. The 1991 Bamako Convention Article 3 (f)-(g), provides an example of this in the field of pollution
control by requiring certain clean production methods. Another typical operationalisation is the employment of
an environmental impact assessment. See also Trouwborst 2006 pp. 170-182.
115 See also Kuusiniemi 1992a p. 15.
116 De Sadeleer 2002 pp. 270-271.
117 See de Sadeleer 2002 pp. 272-275.
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law118. They may also play a role in customary international law-making process by attracting
and channelling state practice.119
When a principle is set out in a hard-law instrument – a treaty or a convention in international
law – it should, according to de Sadeleer, have the normative value that is attached to the
instrument itself120. This does not mean, however, that the form or the type of the instrument
would determine the legal status of the principle in question, and that a principle set out in an
international convention would automatically be a normative principle121. De Sadeleer claims
that a distinction should be made between the principles set out in the preambular sections of
treaties and principles found in the operational parts, and that a principle can be normative
only to the extent it is affirmed by an operative provision of a convention. The role of
principles merely mentioned in the preamble is simply to inform the more precise legal norms
contained in the convention’s operative paragraphs.122
The effect of principles is often weakened by the way they are expressed in treaties, as they
are not always presented as normative principles that are directly binding on states. First,
principles often appear in framework treaties, as has been the case in the climate change
context. They would, however, need to be made operational through protocols adopted to
implement framework conventions. Also the wording by which the principles are adopted
should be obligating.123
Principles have also been seen as implications of the process of deformalisation of law. They
are open-ended, and do not create obligations or commitments that would be executable124.
118 See Shelton 2000 p. 10; Kiss 2000 pp. 223-242. It has already been pointed out earlier in this chapter that
principles often need to be concretised into specific requirements or norms – operationalised – in order for them
to become fully operational.
119 De Sadeleer 2002 pp. 312-313.
120 See also Beyerlin 2007 p. 437.
121 See Chinkin 2000 pp. 25-26.
122 De Sadeleer 2002 pp. 313-314; see also Cassese 2005 p. 47.
123 See de Sadeleer 2002 pp. 314-315.
124 It may be presented as a counter-argument that principles still do not liberate the decision-maker from the
confines of the law, but rather set limits to the application of rules that always include room for interpretation –
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Furthermore, principles typically require decision making in casu due to their generality and
indeterminate nature.125
The validity and the question of bindingness of principles are crucial within the context of the
climate regime. Principles could serve a stabilising (coherence-enhancing) purpose by steering
interpretation in different fora and harmonising legislation at different levels. Principles also
reflect the value basis behind the rules of the climate regime, and in this way improve the
legitimacy of the different policy measures adopted within the system, especially those in
connection with the use of the Kyoto mechanisms, particularly JI and CDM project
agreements. For example bearing in mind the precautionary principle and sustainable
development in designing project activities may contribute to ensuring that the project based
mechanisms serve their purpose in facilitating the fulfilment of commitments as well as
ensuring the environmental benefit without simultaneously causing other environmental
hazards.126
2.2.4 Special Regimes
Special regimes127 are a factor in the discussion concerning fragmentation of international law,
as well as the discussion concerning the possibility of independence of subsystems of
international law, such as international environmental law. They have been seen as a feature of
the post-modern era of law, as well as a result ensuing from the fragmentation of international
law128. They may also be seen as contributors to this development, as they tend to emerge as
responses to particular problems.
125 This has given rise to criticism, see Tuori 2002 pp. 179-180; see also the discussion concerning the
indeterminacy of the doctrine of absolute sovereignty in Kuokkanen 2002 pp. 22-24.
126 This is how principles have been viewed in the earlier, substantive parts of this study presented in separate
articles, regardless of the problems brought forward in the international law discourse.
127 This terminological choice is due to the position taken by Koskenniemi 2006 para. 152(5), according to whom
self-contained regimes should not be called “self-contained”, although this is an established characterisation of
the issue – they should rather be referred to as “special regimes”, as in reality, these regimes are not self-
contained. What they are instead, is increasingly specialised norm constructions.
128 See Kuokkanen 2002 p. 271; Koskenniemi 2007 p. 4.
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Systems based on framework conventions, that are especially typical in dealing with
environmental problems, are on a regular basis raised in this connection129. The approach, in
which conventions containing only very general provisions are complemented by
implementing protocols, is not a new phenomenon within international environmental law.
The regime based on the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change is an example of
this. A similar approach has been adopted e.g. in the Vienna Convention on the Protection of
the Ozone Layer and the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, with its
several protocols on different pollutants.130
Regimes have in political theory been defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms,
rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given
area of international relations”, and as man-made arrangements “for managing and limiting
conflicts of interests in a setting of interdependence”. Special regimes are responses to these
problems of coordination and situations where the pursuit of self-interest by states risks
producing an undesirable outcome.131 They can be seen as dynamic processes of continuous
decision making and negotiation which are capable of securing universal, or nearly so,
participation and support. They have been seen as including the obligation to fulfil non-
reciprocal obligations and to cooperate in good faith for the promotion and implementation of
the objectives of the special regime. Thus, they have been seen as including also an obligation
to cooperate with one another, the necessary institutional and functional mechanisms to attain
compliance, and the legal basis for further action.132
129 See e.g. Perrez 2000 p. 235.
130 See Keohane 1984 pp. 57-59; Ruggie 1975 pp. 557-584; Simma 1985 p. 111; Krasner 1983 p. 2; Young, 1983
p. 93. The term “regime”, or “special regime”, is used here to refer to what Young has called “negotiated orders”,
and more specifically “constitutional contracts” in his typology of regimes, see Young 1983 p. 99. See also
Brunnée 2002 pp. 7, 17 n. 78.
131 Krasner 1983 p. 3; see also Puchala & Hopkins 1983 pp. 61-62. But cf. Stein 1983 p. 116 n. 1; Young 1983 p.
93, whose definition is, however, only slightly different from that of Krasner’s; Perrez 2000 pp. 232, 235. But cf.
Young 1989 p. 5, who points out that “there remain substantial ambiguities about the core meaning of the concept
of an international regime as well as the relationship between regimes and international institutions more
broadly”, and p. 195, where he criticises Krasner’s definition for not allowing us “to identify regimes with
precision and to separate regimes easily from the rest of international relations”.
132 See Perrez 2000 p. 236 and the references therein; see also Puchala & Hopkins 1983 pp. 61-62; according to
Koskenniemi the term “self-contained regime”, the use of which has been established in international law, is used
in two senses: first, in a narrow sense to refer to “a special set of secondary rules under the law of State
responsibility that claims primacy to the general rules concerning consequences of a violation”, and second, in a
broader sense to refer to “interrelated wholes of primary and secondary rules, sometimes also referred to as
‘systems’ or ‘subsystems’ of rules that cover some particular problem differently from the way it would be
covered under general law”, see Koskenniemi 2006 para. 128; see also Puchala & Hopkins 1983 p. 63, who point
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Managerialism is a feature often associated with regimes. The emergence of second generation
environmental problems, where uncertainty of scientific information is a defining
characteristic, has brought about uncertainty as to the causes and consequences of these large-
scale environmental problems. It has been recognised that there might be no solution available
to these problems, at least none based on the current knowledge, and that it might be necessary
to move from problem-solving to their management.133 For this reason, technical expertise has
been integrated into regimes one way or another, and thus, “the distinction between the
political and technical issues has virtually disappeared”.134
These aspects of co-operation and coordination refer to the nature of regimes as processes.
They entail an on-going co-operative and discursive process of evolving relations between
states. New rules and procedures are created or old ones changed or altogether discarded along
the way in response to the own inner dynamics of the regime or to changes in the political,
economic and social environments.135 The idea of special regimes is that they are more than
merely temporary arrangements that change “with every shift in power or interests”. As
opposed to one-time agreements which are either fulfilled or not, regimes create a framework
for an on-going co-operation, negotiation and adjustment of obligations.136 This turn away
from reliance on formal rules and their implementation (deformalisation) is inspired by a
search for the legitimacy of the law (its capacity to reflect distributive and procedural concerns
of international justice) and avoidance of disobedience.137 For this same reason the success of
individual regimes cannot be measured by how successfully they institutionalise centralised
out that “a regime exists in every substantive issue-area in international relations where there is discernibly
patterned behaviour. Wherever there is regularity in behaviour some kinds of principles, norms or rules must
exist to account for it.” This has been further specified by Stein, who adds the requirement that the patterned state
behaviour results from joint rather than individual decision making, see Stein 1983 p. 117. But cf. slightly
differently Keohane 1984 pp. 59-62, according to whom “it clarifies the definition of a regime …  to think of it in
terms of injunctions of greater or lesser specificity”, as the obligations implied by a regime are not enforceable
through a hierarchical legal system; Gehring 1990 p. 55; Boyle 1999 p. 63.
133 Kuokkanen 2002 pp. 266-267, who views this shift to environmental management as typical to the post-
modern era.
134 See Kuokkanen 2002 p. 272; Gehring 1990 pp. 38-42.
135 See Young 1989 pp. 95-96; see also Brunnée 2002 p. 8.
136 See Krasner 1983 pp. 2-3; see also Brunnée 2002 pp. 33-34, on the interactional understanding of international
law.
137 See Koskenniemi 2005b.
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authority in world politics, or how solid the patterns of obligations and legal liabilities within
them are.138
In regimes based on framework conventions the axis between a substantive approach to law on
one hand and a formal one on the other, which I have outlined in my two last articles139, is
especially present and visible. The procedures and the forms of co-operation have to a large
extent been defined in the framework conventions. The co-operation relies on those. But the
substantive obligations are liable to change along the way, based on the progress in
negotiations, and increase of scientific knowledge and understanding of the problem that
needs to be tackled.140 Thus the substance of the regime is formed and reformed as the process
moves on141.
This, in turn, reveals the inequality and the lack of equivalence between the roles and positions
employed by states on one hand and non-state entities that often are involved in carrying out
activities under regimes on the other142. The development of regimes depends formally on
states; the participation of non-state entities is “at the mercy” of states also in this respect. On
138 See Keohane 1984 p. 88; for examples see Kuokkanen 2002 pp. 276-277.
139 See Melkas 2007a; Melkas 2007b.
140 See Keohane 1983 p. 170; see also Krasner 1983 pp. 3-5, according to whom “a fundamental distinction must
be made between principles and norms on the one hand and rules and procedures on the other …  Changes in rules
and decision-making procedures are changes within regimes, provided that principles and norms are unaltered”,
whereas changes in principles and norms are changes of regimes. Accordingly, a regime has weakened, if the
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures of a regime become less coherent, or if actual practice
is increasingly inconsistent with principles, norms, rules and procedures. In this typology the principles of the
regime define, in general, the purposes that their members are expected to pursue, norms to somewhat clearer
injunctions to members about legitimate and illegitimate behaviour, although defining responsibilities and
obligations in relatively general terms. The rules of the regime overlap to some extent with norms; rules are,
however, more specific, they indicate in more detail the specific rights and obligations of members. “Finally, at
the same level of specificity as rules, but referring to procedures rather than substances, the decision-making
procedures of regimes provide ways of implementing their principles and altering their rules”, see Keohane 1984
p. 58. See also Simma & Pulkowski 2006 p. 527: “It is crucial to distinguish between reciprocity as a formal
characteristic of a norm on the one hand, and reciprocity as a substantive do-ut-des relationship on the other.
Human rights treaties do not involve such a substantive exchange, since their ultimate beneficiaries are
individuals under the jurisdiction of the state undertaking the obligation”; see also Young 1989 p. 15, according
to whom “the core of every international regime is a cluster of rights and rules”. For a more detailed discussion
on rules in regimes, see Young 1989 pp. 16-18.
141 An example of this formation and reformation of substance are the commitment periods used in the Kyoto
Protocol – the substantive emission reduction and limitation commitments are made (at this stage) for five years
at a time, and the idea is to review those obligations on a regular basis. At the time of writing this, the future of
the climate regime beyond the first commitment period is under negotiation.
142 See my previous articles Melkas 2007a pp. 12-13; Melkas 2007b pp. 271-273. The participation of different
non-state entities in international co-operation on the environment is, in fact, a product of regime-formation as
well as a feature in international law also at a more general level, see Rosenau 1990 pp. 245-246; Kuokkanen
2002 pp. 274-275; Sands 2000 pp. 543-548; Walser 1998 p. 1618.
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the other hand non-state entities often have significant roles as background influence in many
regimes.
An example of a possible role that non-state entities may have within regimes is provided by
the US – Shrimp case by the WTO Appellate Body. In the US – Shrimp case  the US claimed
that in its earlier finding in the same subject-matter the Panel had erred in finding that it could
not accept non-requested submissions from non-governmental organisations. The US claimed
that there is nothing in the Dispute Settlement Understanding that prohibits panels from
considering information just because the information has been unsolicited. The wording of
Article 13.2143 of the DSU is broad – it provides the panel with discretion in choosing its
sources of information, and may well be interpreted as allowing it to take into account this
kind of information.144 The Appellate body found that the Panel had erred in its decision that
accepting NGO’s amicus briefs was incompatible with the provisions of the Dispute
Settlement Understanding. Thus, now NGO’s with relevant interests on the matter may submit
their viewpoints in the form of amicus briefs to a panel.145
As can be read in the above text, regimes consist of and their rules apply to, in the first
instance, states. The reason for this is that states are the primary actors under international law
and members of the international society. It must, however, be acknowledged also that the
parties that are actually engaging in the activities governed by special regimes may also be,
and frequently are, private entities, such as multinational corporations, banks, fishing
companies, or, as typically is the case in the climate context, energy or environmental
consultancies. The forms of involvement of these non-state entities have in some respects
come to replace the classical forms of state intervention.146 Their role, however, differs in a
significant way from that of states, as has been pointed out above, and they are by no means in
an equal or equivalent position147. This difference in the position of states vis-à-vis private
143 “Panels may seek information from any relevant source and may consult experts to obtain their opinion on
certain aspects of the matter”, see United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products
(WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998), para. 99.
144 See United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October
1998), para. 9.
145 See Ahn 1999 pp. 839-843.
146 See de Sadeleer 2002 pp. 246-247; Rosenau 1990 pp. 245-246.
147 See also Brunnée 2002 p. 49, who further points out that “it seems also appropariate, however, that their [non-
governmental groups’ or industry groups’] participation remains different from that of state parties”.
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entities under international law means that states make the rules and undertake the actual
substantive obligations. It is also in most cases states’ responsibility to ensure that non-state
entities comply with the dictates of the regimes.148 Besides this, the competence of the non-
state entities is usually dependent on state approval.
Special regimes always need to be located in the wider context of international law. General
international law may come for rescue where the particular special law remains silent. Also
the general principles of international law apply.149 Furthermore, general international law
usually determines e.g. which actors are competent to take part, and provides the basis for the
validity of the regimes.150 Thus, special regimes of this kind are not independent from general
international law.151
On the contrary, they are in many respects firmly and precisely international law: They receive
their binding force under international law, and the conditions for their validity and invalidity
are assessed by general international law, more specifically, where treaties are involved, the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties152. Furthermore, special regimes are always partial
in a manner that makes them differ from national legal systems in a significant way. This
means that special regimes presume the presence of a large number of other rules in order to
function – they require the “systemic environment” provided by general international law.153
Thus, special regimes do not exist in isolation of their normative environment – on the
contrary, the presence of a special regime necessitates a contextual interpretation of the rules
adopted within the special regime, context here referring to the normative context, not the
148 See Young 1989 pp. 13-14.
149 Cullet 1999 p. 173; see also Dispute Concerning Access to Information under Article 9 of the OSPAR
Convention (Final Award 2 July 2003) para. 84, ILR vol. 126 (2005) p. 364; analogously Saudi Arabia v.
ARAMCO, ILR vol. 27 (1963) p. 165; Keohane 1984 p. 63, according to whom “international regimes should not
be interpreted as elements of a new international order ‘beyond the nation-state’”.
150 See also Lindroos 2005 p. 51.
151 See Simma 1985, 115-118; Koskenniemi 2004 paras. 19, 22-23, 105-172; on the concept of “general
international law” see Koskenniemi 2004 para. 192. This also goes to show that international environmental law,
of which regimes of this kind are representatives, is not independent of international law. See also Koskenniemi
2006 paras. 192-193.
152 See in more detail Koskenniemi 2006 para. 194. The Vienna Convention is, in fact, codified customary law,
and hence, general international law.
153 Koskenniemi 2006 paras. 177-179.
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factual one. Specific norms must be read against other relevant norms, again “in a ‘mutually
supportive’ light”.154
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31, may be interpreted155 to support
the conclusion presented earlier, that the normative environment of a rule does make a
difference in the interpretation. According to paragraph 1 of that Article a treaty (e.g. the
Kyoto Protocol) shall be interpreted, inter alia, in the light of its object and purpose (which are
in the context of the climate regime mainly presented in other parts of the climate regime,
most importantly the Convention and the Protocol). Furthermore, according to paragraph 2
“the context for the purpose of interpretation of a treaty shall comprise,
in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) any
agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties
in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument
which was made by one or more parties in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an
instrument related to the treaty”.
In addition to this, any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation
of the treaty or the application of its provisions shall be taken into account.156
As the documents and decisions approved under the Climate Convention can be placed under
several of these paragraphs, it seems justified to conclude that it would be contrary to the
Vienna Convention, as well as defeat the object and purpose of the Climate Convention not to
follow the provisions of the Convention in the application of the rules adopted within the
climate regime, and thus not to take the normative context into account in the interpretation of
154 See Vienna Convention Art. 31(3)(c); see also Simma & Pulkowski 2006 p. 492. For case law, see United
States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 April 1996), Section III B;
Korea – Measures Affecting Government Procurement (WT/DS163/R, 19 June 2000), at paras. 7.93-7.96; Oil
Platforms Case (Iran v. United States of America) (Merits) ICJ Reports 2003, para. 40. But cf. Koskenniemi
2006 paras. 416-419 for a critical remark: “This points to the need to carry out the interpretation so as to see the
rules in view of some comprehensible and coherent objective, to prioritize concerns that are more important at the
cost of less important objectives”.
155 Special regimes are, at least within the environmental field to a large extent a newer phenomenon than the
Vienna Convention itself. This calls for interpretation.
156 See also Rajamani 2006 pp. 97, 237-239. The WTO Panel has adopted a restrictive interpretation on this
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different provisions.157 The same applies to the Kyoto Protocol both as “a document and a
decision approved under the Convention”, as well as the decisions of the Conference of the
Parties to the Convention and the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol.
Take for example the rules concerning compliance in the climate regime158 and the general
international law rules concerning state responsibility159. The procedure under the
Enforcement Branch of the Compliance Committee160 is applicable only in three cases
according to the set of rules mentioned first: first, in a case of a failure by a state party to fulfil
its emission reduction obligations, second, in a case of a failure to comply with the
methodological and reporting requirements, and third, in a case of a failure to comply with the
eligibility requirements under Articles 6, 12 and 17 (the flexibility mechanisms). The Kyoto
Protocol, however, imposes also other obligations upon the parties, for instance concerning
transfer of technology and the provision of financial resources161, which have, thus, not been
covered by the procedure under the Enforcement Branch set out in the COP-decision
concerning compliance162. In other words, as the exclusive wording of the decision does not
include those other obligations, the procedure under the Enforcement Branch is not applicable
to breaches thereof. Accordingly, it would seem that the general international law rules
concerning state responsibility would apply to these other breaches of treaty. Another question
is, whether these other obligations are formulated in a sufficiently specific manner in order to
be considered as legally binding obligations.
157 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1155 UNTS 18232, 23 May 1969), Art. 31(1), according to
which “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”. The object and purpose of the Kyoto
Protocol can be found in the Climate Convention to a great extent. See also Rajamani 2006 pp. 97, 237. For case
law, see e.g. McElhinney v. Ireland (App no 31253/96) ECHR 2001-XI, para. 36; Al-Adsani v. the United
Kingdom (App no 35763/97) ECHR 2001-XI, para. 55; Bankovic et al. v. Belgium et al. (Grand Chamber
Decision as to the admissibility) (App no 52207/99) ECHR  2001-XII, para. 57; Loizidou v. Turkey (App no
40/1993/435/514) ECHR 1996-VI, para. 43, all of which shed light on the interpretation of Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, albeit are located within the field of human rights law.
158 See decision 24/CP.7 (FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.3).
159 See the ILC Draft Articles on State responsibility, GA Res. 56/83 (12 Dec. 2001), Annex.
160 The Compliance Committee includes also another branch, the facilitative branch, the competence of which has
a wider scope. The activities of the enforcement branch are, however, more equivalent to the logic of the general
international law rules concerning state responsibility, as they concern the consequences of non-compliance
instead of assistance towards compliance. This is why only the Enforcement Branch is addressed here.
161 See Kyoto Protocol, Articles 10 and 11.
162 See decision 24/CP.7, Part I.
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, albeit are located within the field of human rights law.
158 See decision 24/CP.7 (FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.3).
159 See the ILC Draft Articles on State responsibility, GA Res. 56/83 (12 Dec. 2001), Annex.
160 The Compliance Committee includes also another branch, the facilitative branch, the competence of which has
a wider scope. The activities of the enforcement branch are, however, more equivalent to the logic of the general
international law rules concerning state responsibility, as they concern the consequences of non-compliance
instead of assistance towards compliance. This is why only the Enforcement Branch is addressed here.
161 See Kyoto Protocol, Articles 10 and 11.
162 See decision 24/CP.7, Part I.
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Besides this, the coverage of this compliance regime is to begin with limited – apart from the
advisory and facilitative functions of the Facilitative Branch163. Even if the most important
obligations probably are covered, the fact that the system defines which obligations are
covered simultaneously excludes everything else. This “else” may include e.g. obligations to
be adopted by the COP and the COP/MOP in the future – provided that the rules concerning
compliance are not amended accordingly.164
General international law – including the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties – as well
as other applicable and binding rules of international law, provide a “safety net” in the playing
field of often very objective-oriented and issue-specific regimes set up to provide solutions to
particular problems. Not only does it provide assistance in situations of lacunae, but they also
guide the interpretation. Thus, it serves functions quite similar to the ones served by
principles.165 As Georges Abi-Saab has put it, “…  if all links [to the international legal order]
are severed, the special regime becomes a legal order unto itself – a kind of legal Frankenstein,
or Kelsen’s ‘gang of robbers’ – and no longer partakes in the same basis of legitimacy and
formal standards of pertinence.”166
The extent to which general international law may come for rescue remains unclear,
however.167 It seems appropriate to conclude that insofar as the rules of a particular special
regime cover the legal ground, the application of general international law is excluded, but
163 See decision 24/CP.7, Part IV, paras. 4-5.
164 See also Koskenniemi 2006 para. 172, according to whom “though States have the faculté to set aside much of
the general law by special systems of responsibility or rule-administration, what conclusions should be drawn
from this depends somewhat on the normative coverage or ‘thickness’ of the regime. The scope of a special State
responsibility regime is normally defined by the relevant treaty. No assumption is entailed that general law would
not apply outside of the special provisions.”
165 See Différend concernant l’accord Tardieu-Jaspar (Belgium/France) Award of 1 March 1937, UNRIAA, vol.
III p. 1713; see also Koskenniemi 2006 paras. 415-416, 434; see also Amoco International Finance Corporation
v. Iran, Iran – US C.T.R., vol. 15, 1987-II, p. 222, para. 112; United States – Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products (WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998), para. 158; United Nations International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Human Rights Committee: General Comment, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6,
November 2, 1994, 34 ILM 839 (1995).
166 Abi-Saab 1999 p. 926; see also Simma & Pulkowski 2006 p. 492; for case law, see e.g. within the WTO
regime US – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Appellate Body,
(WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 April 1996), Section III B; US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
Report of the Appellate Body (WT/DS58/AB/R, 6 November 1998), para. 129. On the application of general
international law within human rights regimes, see Koskenniemi 2006 paras. 161-164, and within WTO law, see
Koskenniemi 2006 paras. 165-171.
167 See Simma & Pulkowski 2006 p. 501. This discussion approaches the vivid discussion within international
law scholarship concerning universalism and particularism in international law, see e.g. Simma & Pulkowski
2006 pp. 504-505, 510-512.
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where they do not cover the ground, it should be possible to apply general international law.168
This may lead to the application of both the rules of the special regime and rules of general
international law within the regime in question to issues that seem very similar at least at the
first glance.169
2.3 Turning International Environmental Law into Action
Previously in international law the forms and means of domestic implementation of
obligations set out in international agreements have been left up to the implementing states
parties themselves to determine. It seems now that within the field of environmental law this
state of affairs has changed along with the expansion in the number of environmental treaties,
at least in the case of those treaties. These treaties often do not contain clear, detailed or
specific rules that could without any further ado be enacted into national law. Framework
conventions addressed to above are an example of this.170
The other side of the coin are protocols and decisions adopted within the organisation set up
by these framework conventions. These entail regulation that no longer merely stipulates an
end result to be achieved, but provides for mechanisms of implementation and technical
requirements that leave little latitude for the states parties. This detailed and technical
regulation may better reach the actual culprits – individuals, firms etc. – that cause the
pollution that international environmental treaties aim to mitigate, as the requirements set by
this regulation tend to fall within the confines of their activities, and the role of states often
merely includes the formal adoption of the obligations. They are under their home state’s
jurisdiction, and thus their conduct cannot be directly addressed by means of international
treaties, to which only states and intergovernmental organisations may be parties.171
168 See also Simma & Pulkowski 2006 pp. 525-526.
169 The PCIJ and the ICJ have, however, on occasion come to different conclusions, see S.S. Wimbledon, PCIJ,
Ser. A, No. 1, 1923, pp. 23-24; Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, ICJ,
General List No. 64 (24 May 1980), pp. 38-40; see also Simma & Pulkowski 2006 p. 491.
170 Birnie & Boyle 2002 p. 14.
171 See Ebbesson 1996 p. 53; Sands 2000 p. 397.
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This is not, however, entirely without problems. Regimes under framework conventions are
usually formulated in an open-ended manner, which necessitates the decisions taken within
these regimes, prepared by representatives appointed by governments and experts appointed to
the supervisory organs.172 For example, the rules adopted within the climate regime have
turned out to be detailed and technical to the extent that renders questionable the freedom of
the individual state party to determine the forms and means of implementation. Still, the
commitments that governments make in joining a regime do reduce the flexibility available to
those governments, and limit their ability to act “on the basis of myopic self-interest”173.
Furthermore, the diversity of political, legal and social contexts within which policy initiatives
are located will need to be realised. The regulation within particular subsystems becomes “one
size fits all” –type of regulation, where no room exists for national particularities.174 This may,
depending on the state party, even lead to constitutional problems in the implementation
process, such as problems concerning the fundamental rights of individuals, as set out in the
national constitution.175
A more pluralistic approach would certainly help avoid the constitutional pitfalls and preserve
the possibility of national particularities, but it falls outside the scope of this study to define
what exactly this approach would be like. Suffice it to state here that environmental protection
de facto requires some degree of universality. And if it is found appropriate to introduce such
goals into environmental policy – and through environmental policy eventually into
international law – as cost-effectiveness, for example, a purely domestic implementation is
172 See Koskenniemi 2007 p. 4; see also Shelton 2000 p. 12, who speaks of the bureaucratisation of international
institutions as an explanation for the use of soft law.
173 Keohane 1984 pp. 108, 115.
174 See Kennedy 2001 p. 482-484, according to whom the problem is not only the failure of policy solutions to
respect local cultures, but also their tendency to underestimate the specificity of the culture of international
governance itself; see also Koskenniemi & Leino 2002 p. 557; Higgins 2001 p. 121, according to whom a
consequence of the recent move to emphasise the informal relations between different actors as the basis of all
activity and the transformation of the role of the state from legislator into a facilitator and enabler of different
self-regulating systems, is the inseparability of international and national even in politics or administration. This
was already addressed earlier in this text, see Ch. 2.1.
175 But cf. Ebbesson 1996 p. 225, according to whom “the substantive international rules concerning individuals
may also be better adjusted to the domestic legal tradition, legislative drafting, and procedural and administrative
structures. This is also the case when it is difficult to determine whether a treaty concerns the legal situation of
individuals. Transformation would then be more adequate as a means for ‘filling out’ the normative framework of
the international substantive rules.” See also Tuori 2004 p. 1213; Koskenniemi 2007 p. 4.
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likely to prove insufficient, and some international structures will be needed176. The extent,
nature and functions of these international structures are then another matter.
Brunkhorst has pointed out a paradox in connection with this: “The independence of global
law from states (and other social systems) is growing simultaneously with its dependence on
states (and other social systems), and vice versa”. States themselves have created systems
among themselves that function according to their own laws, albeit a part of the international
legal system – but have not noticed the demands that the functioning of these systems poses to
the national sphere. Thus, states are still significant driving forces in the process of
globalisation, but the global order created by states has evolved towards a set of autonomous
social orders. To quote Brunkhorst, “it [the state] has to adapt to a widely changed role and to
perform a much more specialised function, restricted more or less to the organisation of
administrative power and social welfare”.177
This implies tensions between, first, the democratic legitimacy178 of the special regime and the
increasing reliance on expert knowledge179, and, second, reliance on state sovereignty in the
176 See my previous articles, Melkas 2007a pp. 13-23; and Melkas 2007b pp. 274-288 on the tensions between
cost-effectiveness and the spatial flexibility entailed by it on the one hand and the sovereign equality of states on
the other.
177 See Brunkhorst 2002 pp. 683-685. Brunkhorst comes, however, to the conclusion that “a high level of hard-
law human rights” has come to constitute what rules the global legal order.
178 See Wessels & Katz 1999 p. 5: “Democratic legitimation rests both on the effectiveness of policy
achievements and on popular representation and participation. Democracy as an ideal combines these two criteria
of governance and representation that are often seen being in tension…  There is an inevitable trade-off between
output legitimacy and input legitimacy, between an emphasis on government for the people and an emphasis on
government by the people… ”. See also Maus 1989 p. 143, who speaks of the de-differentiation of democratic
legitimation and moral grounding of law, and how that signifies the usurpation of a social control function by the
political decision making bodies. According to her, furthermore, “it leads to a situation whereby the potential
conflict between democratic and moral justification of legal decisions is resolved within the organs of the state
which tend …  to relieve themselves of the onus to obtain empirical consent. The moral argument can then easily
be misused as a substitute for democracy”. See also Brunnée 2002 pp. 11-14, according to whom international
law would fall short “measured against standards of democratic legitimacy”, at least if understood in the sense of
a political system of popular representation and majority decision making. But the involvement of non-state
actors may turn out to be crucial in this sense.
179 See e.g. Beck 1995 pp. 116-117, according to whom “if one asks, say, what levels of artificially produced
radiation the population is to accept, i.e. where to situate the thresholds of tolerance that separate normality from
danger, the Atomgesetz (Nuclear Law) provides only a general answer: the requisite prior provision is to
correspond to the ‘state of science and technology’ …  This formula is then filled out in the ‘guidelines’ of the
commission for reactor safety – an ‘advisory body’ of the Ministry of the Environment, in which representatives
of the engineering associations have the last word”; also Beck 1990 pp. 102-103. Note that also principles may be
seen as a contribution of expert knowledge to law, as they have been largely developed by the legal scholarship –
even if adopted by the competent decision making bodies.
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choice of means and methods in the implementation of internationally agreed standards and
the increasing use of very technical regulation.180 As Kuokkanen has pointed out:
“As technical expertise was more firmly internalised within the
environmental regimes, traditional diplomacy and politics began to lose
their former role. Through the partnership of policy and science, regimes
were created on a long-term basis to manage potentially adverse problems.
Various new techniques were also developed within the regimes, to ensure
compliance, for example. In particular, the administrative side of the
environmental regimes were strengthened in order to manage day-to-day
problems.”181
Locating power in national sovereigns is to some extent a misconception. To cite David
Kennedy: “Myriad networks of citizens, commercial interests, civil organisations and
government officials are more significant than interstate diplomacy”.182 Kennedy illustrates
the problem by dividing the playing field into three parts, foreground, background and context.
In this illustration experts work at the background, between the official decision-makers (“the
prince” in Kennedy’s vocabulary) at the foreground and the laymen in the context. The task of
the experts is to implement and interpret the decisions of the foreground decision-makers for
laymen. They could be scientists, lawyers, administrators, pollsters even.183
The question is not that international law would not be doing its job in governing international
relations, the real problem is the difficulty of finding opportunities for politically contesting
the results it generates. And the power of the discretion of these people in the background,
expert consensus, tends to be underestimated. In fact, it often provides the frame for political
debates and decisions – a factor of significance within the environmental field.184
180 See also Kuokkanen 2002 p. 238.
181 Kuokkanen 2002 pp. 277-278.
182 See Kennedy 2005 pp. 3-4; see also Kennedy 2001 pp. 465-466; Sands 2000 p. 395; Shelton 2000 pp. 6, 13,
according to whom soft law often allows for more active participation of non-state actors.
183 Kennedy 2005 p. 5; see also Wolf 1987 p. 370, who refers to the increase in complexity of everyday risks by
pointing out that everyday experience and everyday knowledge are no longer sufficient to evaluate these risks;
Kuokkanen 2002 p. 236; Walser 1998 pp. 1618-1620.
184 Kennedy 2005 pp. 8-11; Koskenniemi 2005b p. 34; Koskenniemi 2007 p. 10; see also Slaughter 2000 p. 180,
who points out that concerns relating to government networks, e.g. that these networks reflect technocracy more
than democracy, create a need to build mechanisms for accountability to domestic constituencies. See also
Klabbers 2006 pp. 1204-1205.
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Furthermore, the apolitical nature of the influence of these background actors should also not
be taken for granted; on the contrary.185 In fact, assuming that the use of expertise is apolitical
will easily hide the fact that by means of the deformalisation of the law, influential actors are
able to realise their objectives “in the garb of ‘regime management’”186. And as these
managerial decisions do have significance to the different actors and their legal positions, and
to the “distribution of economic and spiritual values”, a legitimacy problem arises.187 Also, it
is not only that the expertise itself may be political to begin with – in order to turn scientific or
technical knowledge into a political decision, a normative (“political”) assessment on how to
distribute the costs and benefits of alternative solutions will need to be made.188
This “new managerial ethos” is well illustrated by the turn into thinking of environmental
problems in terms of sustainable development and the introduction of the common but
differentiated responsibility189. Thinking about international regulation as “law” has turned
into thinking about it as regime management. Within these regimes experts and policy-makers
seek to manage environmental problems sectorally and on a case-by-case basis.190
On the other hand, the discretion of experts has its limits, too; the expertise itself – limited as it
is – limits it. But experts do have an influence on how we perceive the world, what we
imagine things such as law or economy to be, how problems are defined, and this, too, is
limited by the limits of the expertise. So, as expertise is limited, they narrow the range of
solutions considered in accordance with the limits of the expertise.191
Also this aspect should not, however, be exaggerated. Expertise is flexible. Lawyers are able
to criticise reliance on rules or litigation, for example, and economists have an understanding
and vocabulary for things that non-economists think of as matters of “value” rather than
185 See Kennedy 2001 pp. 465, 471-472.
186 See Koskenniemi 2005b p. 6.
187 In a more formal system, this control would be located in the states that manage the system. As global
governance is largely deterritorialised, structures corresponding to those within states are largely absent, see
Koskenniemi 2005b p. 6; Beck 1990 pp. 170-171.
188 Koskenniemi 2005b p. 35.
189 See Koskenniemi 2005b pp. 30-31. This is another aspect connected to the discussion concerning the
integration of environmental and economic or development concerns referred to above, see Pallemaerts 1993 pp.
16-19.
190 See Koskenniemi 2005b p. 33, according to whom this management takes place largely on economic terms.
See also Beck 1995 p. 68; Beck 1990 pp. 104, 170-171.
191 See Kennedy 2005 p. 13, who uses the old adage “to a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail”.
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is not only that the expertise itself may be political to begin with – in order to turn scientific or
technical knowledge into a political decision, a normative (“political”) assessment on how to
distribute the costs and benefits of alternative solutions will need to be made.188
This “new managerial ethos” is well illustrated by the turn into thinking of environmental
problems in terms of sustainable development and the introduction of the common but
differentiated responsibility189. Thinking about international regulation as “law” has turned
into thinking about it as regime management. Within these regimes experts and policy-makers
seek to manage environmental problems sectorally and on a case-by-case basis.190
On the other hand, the discretion of experts has its limits, too; the expertise itself – limited as it
is – limits it. But experts do have an influence on how we perceive the world, what we
imagine things such as law or economy to be, how problems are defined, and this, too, is
limited by the limits of the expertise. So, as expertise is limited, they narrow the range of
solutions considered in accordance with the limits of the expertise.191
Also this aspect should not, however, be exaggerated. Expertise is flexible. Lawyers are able
to criticise reliance on rules or litigation, for example, and economists have an understanding
and vocabulary for things that non-economists think of as matters of “value” rather than
185 See Kennedy 2001 pp. 465, 471-472.
186 See Koskenniemi 2005b p. 6.
187 In a more formal system, this control would be located in the states that manage the system. As global
governance is largely deterritorialised, structures corresponding to those within states are largely absent, see
Koskenniemi 2005b p. 6; Beck 1990 pp. 170-171.
188 Koskenniemi 2005b p. 35.
189 See Koskenniemi 2005b pp. 30-31. This is another aspect connected to the discussion concerning the
integration of environmental and economic or development concerns referred to above, see Pallemaerts 1993 pp.
16-19.
190 See Koskenniemi 2005b p. 33, according to whom this management takes place largely on economic terms.
See also Beck 1995 p. 68; Beck 1990 pp. 104, 170-171.
191 See Kennedy 2005 p. 13, who uses the old adage “to a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail”.
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matters of “efficiency”. This makes it even more difficult to pinpoint the influence that experts
actually have, and to see through the frame this expertise has provided to political debates and
decisions.192
Structural bias, a factor related to the increase in the significance of experts, has an effect on
treaty interpretation within regimes. The system – the actors within it – leans a certain way,
prefers some outcomes to others.193 Each system has its experts, its ethos, its priorities and
preferences194. To cite Jan Klabbers: “… the environmental regime is composed of
environmental experts and activists, and will look at normative issues through the
environmentalist glasses worn by the members of the environmentalist epistemic community.
The trade community does much the same, as does the community of human rights
specialists.”195 It is, at least partly, the result of the increasing significance of experts, the
participation of which has transposed the functional differentiation at the national level onto
the international level, and partly also – one could imagine – the objective-oriented nature of
these subsystems.196
An example of structural bias is the WTO, where both free trade and social policy objectives –
as well as environmental objectives – are provided for in the treaties, but free trade is usually
taken as a starting point in the practice of the WTO organs.197 A similar tendency may be
perceived in the case law produced by the human rights courts.198 This does not, however,
apply in all cases.
192 See Kennedy 2005 p. 22.
193 As for treaty interpretation, this may be seen as leaning on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art.
31(1).
194 Koskenniemi 2006 para. 488.
195 Klabbers 2006 p. 1200.
196 Koskenniemi 2007; see also Sands 2000 p. 402 in connection with the application of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, Article 31(3)(c); Wolf 1987 p. 363, who takes part in the discussion concerning the shift
in environmental policy and law towards open concepts to be given meaning case by case; Walser 1998 pp. 1677-
1678.
197 Koskenniemi 2005a p. 607; European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), (WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, 16 January 1998), Part VI; US – Restriction of Import of Tuna
(DS21/R – 39S/155, 3 September 1991) paras. 5.28, 5.34; US – Restriction of Import of Tuna (16 June 1994) 33
ILM 839 (1994) paras. 5.35-5.42; US – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (WT/DS2/AB/R,
29 April 1996).
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An opposite example from the WTO field is the case concerning the standards for
reformulated and conventional gasoline brought against the United States, where the Appellate
Body interpreted and applied one set of rules by reference to another set of rules, i.e. the rules
concerning free trade by reference to conservation of natural resources.199 In the dispute before
the WTO panel that was appealed to the Appellate Body the appellant was Venezuela, later
joined by Brazil. The topic under dispute was the implementation by the US of its Clean Air
Act (CAA) and the regulation enacted by the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) pursuant to the CAA. The purpose of these instruments was to control the pollution
caused by the combustion of gasoline manufactured in or imported into the United States. The
CAA established two programmes to ensure that pollution from gasoline does not exceed the
levels of the year 1990 and that pollutants in major population centres are reduced. One of
these programmes covered so-called non-attainment areas200, where all gasoline sold to
consumers was supposed to be “reformulated”. The sale of conventional gasoline in these
areas was prohibited. The other programme concerned conventional gasoline, which could be
sold to consumers in the rest of the United States. The EPA, as the authority responsible for
the implementation of these programmes, adopted the Gasoline Rule.
Within the reformulated gasoline programme, domestic refiners, blenders and importers could
take advantage of an interim method of certification (“the simple model”) before having to
comply with the general method applicable to everyone (“the complex model”). The
conventional gasoline programme only required that gasoline produced by domestic producers
remain as clean as the 1990 baselines. The WTO Panel found this unjustifiable under Article
XX, paragraphs (b), (d) and (g) of the General Agreement. As opposed to this, the Appellate
Body confirmed the general rule of interpretation found in Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties201 by stating that “the words of a treaty, like the General
199 See Sands 2000 p. 550.
200 Nine large metropolitan areas that have experienced the worst summertime ozone pollution; and various
additional areas included at the request of the state governors concerned.
201 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31(1): “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
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Agreement, are to be given their ordinary meaning, in their context and in the light of the
treaty’s object and purpose”.202
Within the field of human rights the Loizidou case may serve as an example, although not as
clearly pointing one way or another. In that case, the applicant, a Cypriot national, was the
owner of several plots of land in Kyrenia, in northern Cyprus. In one of the plots work had
commenced for the construction of flats prior to the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus in
1974. One of the flats was intended as a home for her family. The Constitution of the “Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC) provides, inter alia, for the transfer of ownership of
“immovable properties, buildings and installations” that were considered abandoned or
ownerless on 13 February 1975, when the “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” was
proclaimed, or situated within the boundaries of the TRNC on 15 November 1983, to the
TRNC. The international community did not approve of the proclamation.
As for the ownership issue, the Court came to the view that the applicant cannot be deemed to
have lost title to her property as a result of the applicable provision of the Constitution of the
TRNC, and that the applicant must still be regarded as the legal owner of the land. The
continuous denial of access to her property must, according to the Court, be regarded as an
interference with her rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on Enforcement of Certain
Rights and Freedoms not included in Section I of the Convention to the European Convention
on Human Rights, but not under Article 8 of the Convention concerning the right to respect for
one’s home. The decision not to accept the applicant’s claim concerning Article 8 of the
Convention was justified by emphasising the factual state of affairs. The applicant did not in
fact have her home on the land in question; therefore, her right to respect for her home had not
been violated. The Court did, by the application of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, accept that the
applicant was the owner of the property and thus had a right to the protection of this
ownership.203
202 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 April 1996);
concerning this decision, see also Sands 2001 p. 550. Note that the wording refers to “public international law” in
general, not general international law.
203 See Loizidou v. Turkey, ECHR, 18 Dec. 1996, Application No. 15318/89.
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The tensions referred to above – democratic legitimacy of a special regime versus reliance on
experts, reliance on state sovereignty versus technicalities – hint on a transformation in who
the legitimate actors within the international legal system are. These tensions are also
interconnected – the increasing reliance on expert knowledge seems to be one of the major
causes of the technicalities in the regulation, and the democratic legitimacy may be partly
dependent on the possibility to rely on state sovereignty in the choices concerning
implementation. Reliance on state sovereignty in these situations usually entails an
intervention of some kind by the domestic legislative machinery. This, then, creates new
possibilities and new pressures for public participation. These new possibilities could mean
possibilities of involvement to other “representatives of the public” than just NGOs.
An example are the “legal entities” of the climate regime – non-state entities, primarily firms,
that by means of state authorisation may take part in the fulfilment of the commitments under
the Kyoto Protocol.204 Firms with a speciality in a sector that has relevance in a project, e.g.
energy consultancies, may use their expertise to their advantage; provide their expertise in the
project in exchange for emission units that have financial value on the market. Why may this
be problematic from a democratic legitimacy point of view? If one accepts that the term
democratic legitimacy refers to, first, the possibility of people to affect the policy outcomes
and, second, the quality of those policy outcomes, that is beneficial to the people205, the
increase in the significance of experts may e.g. de facto reduce the possibilities for the public
to affect policy outcomes. Publicly available information may turn out to be scarce, the
possibility to participate and have a say in the processes non-existent, to mention but a couple
of examples.
An example of the latter tension (state sovereignty versus technicalities) may be provided by
the international rules concerning national registries under the Kyoto Protocol and their use.
This may also concern the rights and obligations of the private sector taking part in the
activities under the mechanisms, the authorised legal entities.206 National level regulation,
204 See my previous articles, Melkas 2007a; Melkas 2007b; see also Kuokkanen 2002 pp. 238, 274-275; Brunnée
2002 pp. 14-15, who speaks of vertical and horizontal legitimacy.
205 See Wessels & Katz 1999 p. 5.
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should there be some and what kind, concerning the legal position of individuals vis-à-vis e.g.
private property may come into conflict with these internationally agreed upon rules. In any
case, the latitude left for national legislators becomes thinner, the more detailed the
internationally imposed regulation is.207
207 See Koskenniemi 2007 pp. 33-34. Koskenniemi has viewed the central role of experts critically, calling for the
return of politics into international relations: “Managerialism was the dark side of the inter-war project of
imagining international law in technical terms”. The functionality of regimes, necessitating the reliance on
experts, is part of the problem; “interest” is hardly a solid foundation for action. He seems to call for the opening
up of relevant decision making processes, regardless of where they take place – “not only in diplomacy or
intergovernmental organisations but transnational corporations, interest-groups, banks, armies, development
agencies, universities and so on”.
In Finland the use of the mechanisms is regulated by law, an act of Parliament. This may, however, not be
the case everywhere. It depends on the national constitutions whether mere administrative orders or decisions are
sufficient for the implementation of the applicable international and EU rules to, or whether the legislative
machinery will have to be employed.
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3. The Kyoto Mechanisms as New Instruments of International Environmental Law
3.1 The Climate Convention and the Mechanisms: the Application of Articles 2 and 3
As was explained above, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires, first, that a
treaty be interpreted, inter alia, in the light of its object and purpose, and second, that
agreements relating to the treaty between the parties to the treaty in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty belong to “the context for the purpose of interpretation of a treaty”,
and thus, shall be taken into account. Third, any subsequent agreement between the parties
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions shall be taken into
account.208 This must be interpreted to apply not only to the Climate Convention and the
Kyoto Protocol – treaties par excellence – but also to the decisions of the Conference of the
Parties to the Climate Convention and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of
the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, as they are, despite their nomination as “decisions”, in fact
agreements between states.209
The primary rules to be applied in using the mechanisms are, in addition to those rules set out
in the documentation of the individual projects, the applicable COP- and COP/MOP-decisions.
Considering the object and purpose of the mechanisms one should keep in mind the overall
object and purpose of the climate regime, most importantly the goal, however generally
formulated, set out in Article 2 of the Climate Convention210. A reference to Article 2 is made
in the Preambles to some of the COP/MOP-decisions concerning the mechanisms, but even if
it were not, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention would require taking it into account211.212
208 See Chapter 2.2.1.4 above.
209 It has already been pointed out above that there is at present no consensus as to whether the COP- and
COP/MOP-decisions are legally binding or not, see Ch. 2.1; on this discussion see Brunnée 2002 pp. 23-26, 33-
34, 37-38.
210 According to Article 2 itself, the goal is not just that of the Climate Convention, but also that of any related
legal documents. As has been pointed out earlier in this text this kind of interpretation may be seen as required
also by the Vienna Convention Article 31(1).
211 See decision 2/CMP.1, Preamble; decision 7/CMP.1, Preamble.
212 See my previous articles Melkas 2007a p. 5 and Melkas 2007b p. 275.
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It seems justified to conclude that also Article 3 containing the guiding principles of the
Convention could be considered as belonging to the “context”, as it lays out the values
accepted among the parties to the regime, that underlie these instruments. Accordingly, the
goals and principles set out therein should guide the design of the national climate policies.213
Article 3 does, however, use a conditional wording – “should” instead of “shall”. This
weakens its binding effect. Furthermore, as has been pointed out by de Sadeleer, already the
fact that the principles have been provided for in the Framework Convention instead of the
Protocol has limited their normative value.214 This still cannot be taken to deprive those
principles of all normative value, especially due to the fact that the COP- and COP/MOP-
decisions on occasion refer to these principles (as for the mechanisms, in decisions that
regulate all three mechanisms)215. They still have been adopted and approved by the states
parties to the Convention, and thus carry certain momentum as a reflection of the values
behind the system.
These principles were addressed in “Overview”. The idea was to find content to principles that
have merely been listed in a general article in a framework convention, and at a more general
level take a look at the longer term elements in the legal system that should have an influence
on how the system is operated.
I found out that in the context of the climate regime the principle of common but differentiated
responsibility is intrinsically linked to both sustainability and human needs. Thus it is typical
and quite similar to the other adopted principles in that it seeks to integrate environmental
concerns with human interests. What gives it its identity is the focus on the developmental and
economic differences between developing and developed countries, and the aim of
diminishing those differences.216
213 Note that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was concluded before the emergence of framework
conventions within international environmental law, and thus was not in the position to address those. The
decisions of the meeting of the parties to the Kyoto Protocol also sometimes refer to Article 3 – most importantly
for the mechanisms, decision 2/CMP.1. But even when they do not, it would be justified to consider the Climate
Convention binding upon the implementation of the related legal documents.
214 See de Sadeleer 2002 pp. 313-315.
215 See decision 15/CP.7, Preamble; decision 2/CMP.1, Preamble.
216 See Melkas 2001 pp. 27-28; Perrez 2000 pp. 294-297.
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It also became apparent that in the implementation of the precautionary principle the lack of
scientific certainty is significant. This uncertainty may stem from limited scientific evidence
or lack of scientific agreement concerning the level of risk to be tolerated. However, the
precautionary principle does not provide an unambiguous basis for action, as it is always
bound by existing legal and economic conditions.217 These legal and economic conditions
dictate, inter alia, that there must be some limits to precaution, and that the measures taken
must at least be based on plausible scientific assumptions and that a merely speculative risk is
not sufficient.218 A balancing must take place between the environmental concern and
economic and/or societal interests.219
The principle of sustainable development requires that while seeking to remedy existing
environmental problems, the sources of those problems be influenced. The environmental
costs and benefits should also be equitably shared between and within countries as well as
between present and future generations. Also development and environmental concerns should
be integrated, and accordingly the problems linked to poverty addressed in addition to the
problems connected to global environmental change. A balancing between these different
interests shall take place in the application of the principle. This balancing is, however, a bit
more complex than the one carried out in connection with the precautionary principle. It
involves, in addition to a balancing between developed and developing countries and a
balancing between different interests in developed countries, a balancing between the benefit
incurred from the use of a resource – or an industrial activity, for instance – and the benefit
possible to incur in the future (an intergenerational balancing).220
In the context of climate change and measures to mitigate it, the nature of the problem opens
the possibility for the joint implementation of commitments that has been concretised into the
three mechanisms. As the location of most greenhouse gas emissions is of no importance –
they have no local effects – allowing spatial flexibility does not lead to problems of so-called
hot-spots.
217 Melkas 2001 p. 33 and the references therein.
218 Melkas 2001 p. 34; Rehbinder 1995 pp. 25-26.
219 See Melkas 2001 pp. 35-38, 42; Perrez 2000 pp. 289-291; de Sadeleer 2002 p. 297.
220 See Melkas 2001 pp. 41-43; see also Perrez 2000 pp. 285-286.
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This aspect has met with the goal of cost-effectiveness in the climate regime and, more
specifically, in the flexibility mechanisms. Cost-effectiveness is a criterion and a goal
generally attached to certain policy instruments, such as permit trading, and usually is
understood as requiring that (environmental policy) measures be taken where they are
cheapest221. It has been considered as inherently connected to the mechanisms222. It has been
understood as striving to allow economically the integration of different interests, such as
environmental protection and social policy. Part and parcel thereof is the spatial flexibility
brought about – emission reductions may be made where they are cheapest. Thus emissions
would not be reduced in equal number everywhere. This way cost savings would be possible
and resources saved for other ends, such as national social policies. Or alternatively, more
resources would be left for more ambitious environmental policies.
The idea of cost-effectiveness is consistent with the notion of integration of environmental
protection and development or, more widely, economic concerns. It seeks to make the two
compatible – in this context – by requiring cost-minimisation without compromising the aims
of the policies.223 The problem with this, according to Pallemaerts, is that integration easily
leads to the subordination of environmental protection to the development or economic
interests.224 We would no longer adopt environmental policies merely for the sake of the
environment, but because it is simultaneously economically beneficial, or at least allows cost-
savings. The question arises, whether we will then end up adopting environmental policies
only when cost-savings are available.
Besides this, cost-effectiveness seems inviting to increasing casuistry, as it is flexible as a
standard. Casuistry, then, favours managerialism, which may be seen to be problematic from a
democratic legitimacy point of view. On the other hand, as has been explained above,
casuistry is more open to pluralism and allows more easily different solutions. To ensure some
consistency of interpretations and to contribute to the coherence of law – local or total – one
then needs to turn to principles.
221 This is the way cost-effectiveness is understood in this study.
222 I addressed cost-effectiveness in my third and fourth articles, see Melkas 2007a; Melkas 2007b.
223 Cost-effectiveness is yet another feature of the post-modern phase of the law, see Kuokkanen 2002 pp. 299,
309.
224 See Pallemaerts 1993 pp. 16-19. On the emergence of the integration of environmental and development
concerns, see Kuokkanen 2002 pp. 340-341.
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Considering the amount of recognition cost-effectiveness has received in the applicable
documents (the Convention, the Protocol, the relevant COP- and COP/MOP-decisions) – not
to mention the rest of the volume of international environmental law – the attention paid to it
in designing climate policies seems disproportionate. This does not mean, however, that the
use of cost-effectiveness as a criterion would not be completely legitimate when there is
latitude to choose between different measures, just as well as the use of any other criteria, such
as national social policy demands. But cost-effectiveness cannot override the other accepted
principles, concepts and criteria for environmental policies, such as the principles also
discussed in this study, in decision making. Rather, a balance needs to be struck between
different factors.225
Cost-effectiveness also cannot, as I have concluded in two of my previous articles226, be taken
as the leading goal of the flexibility mechanisms, or the leading goal of the measures
undertaken within the climate regime. It has not been mentioned in the rules concerning the
mechanisms that can be found in the Protocol and several decisions of the COP and the
COP/MOP. It has been mentioned in Article 3 concerning the leading principles of the climate
regime, but primarily as a counterbalance to the precautionary principle.
In “Sovereignty and Equity” I found out that the principle of equity has presented itself in
environmental policy and law primarily in two forms, intragenerational equity and
intergenerational equity. The first refers to equity among people living at the same time (e.g.
equity among states), and the latter to equity between different generations – securing the
possibilities of future generations to the use of the environment. Intergenerational equity is a
central component of the principle of sustainable development.
Differential treatment and the principle of common but differentiated responsibility have been
important manifestations of intragenerational equity, especially in the climate regime.227 They
have previously mainly been used to make distinctions between developing and developed
225 See Melkas 2007b p. 275.
226 See Melkas 2007a; Melkas 2007b.
227 Cullet 1999 pp. 169-170; see also Melkas 2002 p. 122. Other instruments of equity within the climate regime
would be the financial mechanism, technology transfer and the flexibility mechanisms.
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countries. However, the climate regime makes distinctions even among developed countries,
the Convention by categorising the developed states parties into Annex I and Annex II states,
and the Kyoto Protocol by listing those states that have undertaken emission reduction
commitments in its Annex B and differentiating even those obligations state-by-state.228
As for the implementation of these principles in applying the Kyoto mechanisms, it seems that
common but differentiated responsibility serves mainly as an underlying idea guiding and
directing the rights and obligations under the Convention, the Protocol and related documents.
It is, thus, not directed at states implementing their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol at
the domestic level, but rather at the international community striving for agreement on new
standards of protection. As for the others, in the application of all of them a balancing
operation of some kind is in order both in issuing international rules concerning the
mechanisms as well as in implementing them nationally. In the application of sustainable
development this balancing needs to take into account more interests than the application of,
say, the precautionary principle. If these need to be applied simultaneously, the balancing
exercise becomes even more multidimensional. Not only will then economic interests (e.g. the
price of the measure vis-à-vis the economic feasibility of e.g. an industrial activity) and
environmental protection (e.g. the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions by means of, say,
converting a power plant using coal into one using wood) be weighed against one another, but
also the interests of different states involved – especially developing versus developed – as
well as the interests of the yet undefined future generations. This underlines the need to strike
a balance between different interests in operation in the case at hand, a decision which can
only be made in casu. This also underlines the need to operationalise sustainable development,
to write it into the treaty obligations and implementing laws.
All three mechanisms rely on the existing categorisations of the states parties adopted in the
climate regime. The role of equity is smallest in emissions trading, where also the
internationally agreed rules are scarcest, and the greatest in the CDM, which is also the most
regulated of the three. However, as there is no established differentiation within the group of
non-Annex I states229 adopted in the Convention or the Protocol, the realisation of equity as a
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substantive equality of some kind within that group is left to be determined in casu. This takes
place by means of decision making within and among the participant states concerning
individual projects, with only a few guidelines provided by the internationally adopted rules.
Thus, substantive equality of states will ultimately be defined at the project level.230 In this
decision making in casu, principles may serve as steering elements, and create coherence.
In “Overview” I also addressed the polluter pays principle, although it has not been mentioned
in the Convention or in the Protocol. My intention was to find out whether it would have
relevance within the climate regime as customary law. I concluded that the polluter pays
principle may be regarded as customary law within the OECD countries, due to the extensive
OECD practice (even if non-binding as such), but not beyond that group of countries. I also
found out that quite like in the application of e.g. the precautionary principle and sustainable
development, a balancing of different interests is needed to determine the extent of applying
the polluter pays principle in practice as well. This entails, again, a balancing of first and
foremost economic interests against the interests of environmental protection.231
Yet another type of balancing, that needs to be brought up here is balancing between different
principles. It is in the nature of principles that they, unlike rules, are not of an either – or
nature, but can be, and should be, applied simultaneously, by means of balancing232. When
making decisions concerning actual climate policy measures (e.g. the use of the flexibility
mechanisms, or individual projects in the JI and the CDM) and applying the principles in the
process, a balance needs to be struck between different applicable principles. This
determination is also made in casu. This balance should then show in the rules adopted for e.g.
the flexibility mechanisms, as the balance between the applied principles operationalised into
concrete rules, obligations, or at least guidelines. This conclusion then applies both to the rules
adopted at the international level, as well as the implementing measures adopted nationally. It
230 See Melkas, 2007b.
231 See Melkas 2001 p. 50.
232 See e.g. Dworkin 1977 pp. 72, 76. Suffice it to point out here that what Dworkin has stated on the issue is part
of a wider discussion – but to get more deeply into this discussion is beyond the scope of this study. See also
Tuori 2002 p. 180, according to whom the general doctrines play a role in this context by involving “an
anticipatory position” on conflicts between different principles and by suggesting a prima facie order of
preference between principles and counter-principles.
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is, however, worth keeping in mind that the wording of Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol seems
to require that sustainable development be accorded greater weight than other principles233.
All these balancing exercises that are needed in designing and implementing climate policies
make reference to the process of deformalisation of the law and increasing casuistry. The
presence of a special regime in the context creates a need for continuous negotiation and
redefinition of commitments and forms of co-operation. These, in turn, call for taking the goal
set out in Article 2 to the Convention into account and the application of the guiding principles
listed in Article 3 to the Convention in order to, inter alia, avoid excess unpredictability in the
development of the law within the climate regime and the implementation of the
commitments. Hence the goal and the principles could provide a similar safety net that was
referred to above concerning general international law within the particular context of the
climate regime.
Furthermore, the unarticulated, de facto purpose of the mechanisms is a redistribution of
burdens to be undertaken by states on an ad hoc basis. Quite like burden distribution in the
first place, also this redistribution needs criteria. In the case of emissions trading it seems clear
that the decisive criterion is cost-effectiveness – as there is less need for equity and fairness
considerations, as all the participants are developed countries, cost-savings may well gain
priority, besides emission reductions. The same applies to JI, although overall clauses
concerning the economies in transition have also been made. As opposed to this, in the CDM
the decisive criterion for the redistribution of burdens is equity, which means that fairness
among states is a factor to be taken into account.234 Thus, for instance technology, capital and
know-how will need to be transferred.
3.2 General International Law and the Flexibility Mechanisms
As has been stated above, special regimes are regimes under international law. Thus, they rely
on the concepts and structure of international law, and also the general principles of
233 See Kyoto Protocol, Art. 12 (2). See also Melkas 2007b p. 268.
234 See Melkas, 2007b passim.
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international law apply. This means that also international law as a whole may have relevance
to special regimes.
The application of general international law may become necessary e.g. in a case of gaps in
the regime itself. In a case to which no decisive applicable rule may be found within the
special regime, recourse may be sought from other parts of the international legal system, first
and foremost general international law. General international law may also have interpretative
value – the interpretation of the applicable rules will need to ensure their compatibility with
each other and with general international law. A justification for this use of general
international law may be that special regimes are often, perhaps mostly, constructed in an
objective-oriented and problem-based manner235, which then may lead to uncertainty and
unpredictability in the functions and development of the regime. Thus, recourse to general
international law may serve as a stabilising factor, in a similar manner as the recourse within
the particular context of the climate regime to the goal and guiding principles of that regime.
Most important for this study has been the part played by international treaty law, especially as
set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which guides, inter alia the
interpretation of treaties. The importance of this field is highlighted especially by the fact that
it is largely based on customary law.
Sovereignty and equity are examples of principles that have wider relevance in international
law than just in the environmental context, and that define the role occupied by and latitude
allowed for states. State sovereignty is the principle underlying the Climate Convention, the
Kyoto Protocol and all the related documents that have been produced by the Conference of
the Parties to the Convention or the meeting of the Parties to the Protocol – these have, after
all, been produced by the community of states. State sovereignty has also been specifically
mentioned in the Preamble to the Convention as “the principle of sovereignty of states in
international co-operation to address climate change”, as has been the sovereign right of states
to exploit their natural resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental
policies, provided they do not cause damage to the environment of other states or to areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdictions236. Also the methods of reducing emissions have
235 See also Shelton 2000 p. 12.
236 See Preamble, paras. 8 and 9.
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largely been left up to the states, with certain limitations. Such limitations are e.g.
supplementarity concerning the use of the flexibility mechanisms, and the different conditions
set on the use of the mechanisms in the applicable rules.237
It seems that within the field of international environmental law the latitude produced by state
sovereignty has become narrower than before and, perhaps, in many other fields of
international law. The increasing interaction between national and international legal systems
in that field, as well as the emergence of principles emphasising the general interests of all
humankind, such as sustainable development and the precautionary principle, are sources of
these limitations and testify on them. Behind this is the fundamental lack of suitability of state
sovereignty for dealing with pollution issues and environmental problems in inter-state
relations.238
This is especially visible within the climate regime. The agreements and rules within the
regime are negotiated by states represented by officials from the ministries or other competent
authorities dealing with the substantive subject matter. They are drafted in such a technical
and detailed manner, albeit at the same time incorporate compromises, that the domestic
implementation of the rules may turn out to be difficult and easily create a conflict with other
national legislation, constitutions even.
Furthermore, within the project based flexibility mechanisms, JI and CDM, significant
decisions that have an effect on the fulfilment of their international commitments by states are
– in the case of the JI may be – taken by expert organs, the Accredited Independent Entities
(AIEs) and the Designated Operational Entities (DOEs). In addition to this, the latitude of
states in determining their own measures is limited by the introduction of such open-ended and
237 See Melkas 2002 p. 119; even within the flexibility mechanisms, however, the decision whether or not to
participate in the projects or trading is left to the discretion of the states themselves; see also Melkas 2007a pp. 9-
11; Melkas 2007b pp. 267-270.
238 See Koskenniemi 2005b pp. 9-12, who discusses the simultaneously over-inclusive and under-inclusive nature
of state sovereignty, and the need for a functional analysis of sovereignty, proposed by Perrez 2000 pp. 175-242,
that would seek to “maximize the goal for which sovereignty is functional, i.e. the welfare of the state and its
citizens”. This would entail a search for material justifications for sovereignty, instead of formal ones; Perrez
2000 pp. 239-240. This has been seen in government networks: They erase “the domestic/international divide”,
and “the point is precisely to penetrate national sovereignty”, although this is not completely without problems,
see Slaughter 2000 p. 201. On over- and under-inclusiveness of rules, see also Kelman 1987 p. 40.
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237 See Melkas 2002 p. 119; even within the flexibility mechanisms, however, the decision whether or not to
participate in the projects or trading is left to the discretion of the states themselves; see also Melkas 2007a pp. 9-
11; Melkas 2007b pp. 267-270.
238 See Koskenniemi 2005b pp. 9-12, who discusses the simultaneously over-inclusive and under-inclusive nature
of state sovereignty, and the need for a functional analysis of sovereignty, proposed by Perrez 2000 pp. 175-242,
that would seek to “maximize the goal for which sovereignty is functional, i.e. the welfare of the state and its
citizens”. This would entail a search for material justifications for sovereignty, instead of formal ones; Perrez
2000 pp. 239-240. This has been seen in government networks: They erase “the domestic/international divide”,
and “the point is precisely to penetrate national sovereignty”, although this is not completely without problems,
see Slaughter 2000 p. 201. On over- and under-inclusiveness of rules, see also Kelman 1987 p. 40.
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flexible standards as principles, which means that the extent to which a state manages to
realise its own interests may vary from one case to another.
It has also been pointed out that the organisations built around framework conventions and the
like, with their conferences of the parties, supervisory organs etc., contribute to this transfer of
sovereignty from states to the international community. There is a possibility that this
phenomenon would bring with itself an increase in the use of majority decision making.239
This possibility will, however, only become reality if states will allow it to in the relevant
international legal instruments.240 This state of affairs seems to have been taken even further in
the context of the flexibility mechanisms, especially by the internationally authorised powers
granted to the Accredited Independent Entities and the Designated Operational Entities that
employ significant roles in the JI and the CDM.241
Equity, on the other hand, has served as a counterbalance of some sort to strict interpretations
of sovereignty, and entailed a balancing between environmental protection (climate policy
measures) on one hand and human needs and interests on the other. It has been recognised
both in the UNFCCC and in the Kyoto Protocol, and a practical application has occurred in the
common but differentiated responsibilities, which is one of the leading principles in the
Convention.242 It has been evidenced e.g. by the burden-sharing of the Protocol, as well as the
organisation of the CDM. In fact, it is the underlying rationale of the CDM, as the primary
goal of the CDM is sustainable development in the developing countries.
In “Form and Substance” and “Equitable as Equal” the principle of sovereign equality of states
and its compatibility with cost-effectiveness (and vice versa) were discussed, and that
discussion reflected against the rules concerning the flexibility mechanisms, in the former
article emissions trading and in the latter JI and CDM. Sovereign equality has been considered
to be a consequence of state sovereignty. It has been seen as implying a strict equality between
states in their international undertakings, similar treatment to all subjects of the law,
239 See Sands 2000 pp. 397-398.
240 Following Brunkhorst’s line of thinking: “… the independence of global law from states …  is growing
simultaneously with its dependence on states …  and vice versa”, see Brunkhorst 2002 pp. 683-684.
241 See Melkas 2007a pp. 11-13; Melkas 2007b pp. 270-273.
242 See Melkas 2002 p. 125.
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reciprocity of obligations as well as the capacity for equal legal rights and equal duties.243
Strict equality and reciprocity have been moderated, during the past few decades, by
considerations of equity and justice, and as a more concrete manifestation of these, the
principle of common but differentiated responsibility244.
This has allowed differentiation based on de facto differences in states’ positions due to e.g.
economic or developmental differences. It has also introduced a substantive equality as far as
the actual substantive obligations in a treaty go, and left the strict equality rule to serve mainly
as a procedural rule – equality of states in decision making. This has also been reflected in the
flexibility mechanisms – emission reduction burdens (that have already been differentiated)
may be redistributed (this applies to all three mechanisms), but the possibility to influence the
outcomes of the decision making processes (participation in the first place, the contents of the
projects etc.) belongs to the parties equally.245 How equal the burden distribution between two
or more parties, in fact, is, depends on the parties to the individual trade or project. Hence,
removing all inequalities does not seem to be the goal, but merely providing the states parties
with a possibility to influence their burdens after the initial distribution.
Considerations of substantive equality have been included in many parts of the rules
concerning the CDM projects. These considerations include the requirement of the equitable
distribution of CDM projects, and the requirement that CDM projects contribute to the
sustainable development of the developing host countries. In JI and ET these considerations
have less of a role, although it may still be said that they also include an element of
substantive equality by opening a possibility for states to influence their burdens. But the
decisive criterion for substantive equality within these two is likely to be cost-effectiveness
rather than equity, as all the participants are developed states.
243 Melkas 2007a pp. 15-17; Melkas 2007b pp. 277-278; see also Cullet 2003 pp. 22-23; Shearer 1994 pp. 99-
100; Jennigs & Watts 1996 pp. 339-340; Vattel 1758 II, ch. 12, § 172, 158; Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations, GA Res. 2625 (XXV) (1970).
244 This has also happened within the field of human rights, see e.g. Human Rights Committee: General
Comment, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, reproduced in 34 ILM 839 (1995) para. 17; see also Simma & Pulkowski
2006 p. 527.
245 See Melkas 2007a; Melkas 2007b. Kelman 1987 p. 60 brings this up as a phenomenon of law also more
generally when discussing standards (as opposed to rules): “Standards assume that factual inequality trumps
formal equality, that one has to see whether one’s trading partners can actually take care of themselves - -“.
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It seems obvious that the use of the flexibility mechanisms will entail a significant amount of
decision making in casu. This casuistry, on the one hand, will facilitate the taking into account
of aspects such as justice, fairness or cost-effectiveness. On the other hand, it poses a risk to
the coherence and consistency of the regime – and here reference to the discussion above on
the coherence of law can be made. So, in this respect, the flexibility mechanisms, as well as
the entire climate regime, are genuine manifestations of post-modernity in law246.
246 See e.g. Koskenniemi 2007 p. 10, according to whom “most law with universal scope refrains from rule-
setting and instead calls for ‘balancing’ the interests with a view of attaining ‘optimal’ results to be calculated on
a case-by-case basis”. The issue of balancing is approached from a different angle by Nollkaemper 1996 pp. 88-
89, who calls these obligations – rules or principles –contextual obligations, as they require the interpreter to
take into account and strike a balance between many different societal interests.
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4. Kyoto Protocol Flexibility Mechanisms and the State – Conclusions
In this study I have attempted to paint a picture of a new type of regulatory approach to global
environmental problems, notably that of international environmental law and, more
specifically, of the framework created by the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change. International law represents the most promising means in existence to tackle
and overcome these problems – but it is also not without problems.
State sovereignty is one of the core concepts and principles of international law that has
crucial significance also within regimes, including the climate regime. The freedom that states
enjoy due to and within the limits set by state sovereignty has gone through limitations within
the past few decades within international environmental law. These limitations, at a more
general level, have been due to the increasing interaction between national and international
legal systems, the emergence of principles emphasising the general interests of humankind,
such as sustainable development and the precautionary principle, as well as the increase in the
significance of experts in different fields. In principle, states do still enjoy a large freedom to
determine the means and forms employed to fulfil their treaty obligations under the climate
related treaty law. In practice, however, different non-state actors have increasing influence as
to the substance of the law, and the rights and obligations of those involved. Thus, even if the
states retain the formal power of decision, the substantive contents of the regulation
increasingly come from other actors.
Within the framework of the mechanisms, limitations to states’ freedom have been set by the
formalities in connection with the different kinds of exchange of emission units, as well as the
requirement of supplementarity concerning the use of the flexibility mechanisms, and the
different conditions set on the use of the mechanisms in the applicable rules. The role of
experts is especially visible within JI and the CDM, where expert organs with a mandate from
the international organs of the climate regime (the Accredited Independent Entities and the
Designated Operational Entities) carry out functions relating to the fulfilment by states of their
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commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. In fact, the extent of the benefit available to states
from JI and CDM projects is determined ex post facto by these expert organs.247
Furthermore, the presence of a regime necessitates in accordance with the principle of
integration a contextual interpretation of its provisions, i.e. the taking into account of all the
applicable rules and principles adopted within the system. In the context of the climate regime
this refers first and foremost to the Climate Convention, but also to other parts of the regime –
the Protocol, the decisions of the COP and the COP/MOP etc. Specific norms must, thus, be
read against other relevant norms in a mutually supportive light. True, this type of “reading”
may well entail e.g. casuistry and structural bias. But interpretation of norms is always
necessary, regardless of how detailed they are. Principles may serve to limit discretion in these
cases, and in this way limit the mentioned risks.
Clearly, what has been said about special regimes here, also applies to the climate regime and
the application of the different parts of that regime as well. Especially significant in this
respect are the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties concerning
interpretation of treaties, e.g. the requirements that a treaty shall be interpreted in the light of
its object and purpose and that agreements relating to the treaty between the parties to the
treaty in connection with the conclusion of the treaty belong to the context for the purpose of
interpretation of the treaty, and as such shall be taken into account in interpretation.
Accordingly, in the application of the provisions included in the decisions of the COP and the
COP/MOP the provisions of the Convention and the Protocol, as well as the other related
decisions have to be taken into account. This is especially significant considering Articles 2
and 3 of the Convention, which in practice lay out the value basis, justification and goals of
the climate regime. Even if the binding nature of especially Article 3 seems contestable due to
its conditional wording together with its location in a framework convention, these provisions
still have been adopted and approved of by the states parties by consensus.
The role of principles within international environmental law echoes the shift from modern to
post-modern law. Principles facilitate finding agreement between different interest groups by
means of the flexibility they entail, and represent a more discursive and co-operative approach
247 See Melkas 2007a; Melkas 2007b.
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to law that has replaced the classical legal imperative, the command-and-control approach,
which has been supplemented by new forms of involvement of non-state entities.248 In
addition to this, what is even more relevant is the reflection of the value basis of the law and
the connection to morality that principles entail.
Principles are also conducive to legal pluralism by creating possibilities for the existence of
different values and perceptions by means of the flexibility necessary for the balancing of
different interests, and, thus, open up possibilities for a more pluralistic law. The flexibility,
furthermore, allows principles to serve as the glue of the system, ensuring some degree of
coherence, and thus enhancing legal certainty and predictability. Even if we may have very
different rules, and sets of rules, for different situations, there is still a combining element in
principles. By this support of some common values principles could also make the use of the
mechanisms more consistent, coherent and predictable by providing some basic assumptions
as to which way the decision making concerning the mechanisms is going to go. What are the
international rules (should there be changes to them) as well as the national instruments going
to look like? How will the practice be formed?
The increasing casuistry referred to above, inherent in regimes and principles, is a feature of
the post-modern international environmental law. As most law with a universal scope refrains
from rule-setting, different balancing operations have become more and more common – law
is indeed in a process of deformalisation. An example is provided by the principles within the
climate regime: Balancing may take place between different principles (which to apply,
whether to apply several simultaneously, to what extent shall the application take place etc.) or
between different interests within the confines of one principle (e.g. environmental vs.
economic interests in the precautionary principle). What concrete questions these balancing
operations really seek to answer depends on the case at hand. These questions should be
answered by policy makers along the way in transposing the international level regulation, e.g.
the implementation rules of the flexibility mechanisms, into their national legal systems.
As for the role of the non-state entities, their position is neither equal nor equivalent to that of
states, although a possibility of participation is often reserved to them within e.g. special
248 See de Sadeleer 2002 pp. 246-247.
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regimes, and, indeed, the parties that are actually engaging in the activities governed by
special regimes frequently are private entities (multinational corporations, banks,
consultancies).249 At a general level, it seems that whereas the formal decision-making power
still belongs to states, the de facto power to determine the substantive contents of the law and
to influence the rights and obligations of those involved has shifted to these non-state entities
– NGOs, epistemic communities, firms etc. Besides this somewhat hidden and perhaps
unintended shift of power, the climate regime accords significant powers concerning the
implementation of the flexibility mechanisms to certain non-state entities, notably those
known as the Accredited Independent Entities and Designated Operational Entities.
Changes in the state’s role and position within international law has been anticipated and
perceived for some time already250. On the surface it seems that international law-creation
within the particular framework of the climate regime still takes largely place along the lines
of negotiation and agreement between sovereign states, but the substance of the norms created
is often provided or at least strongly influenced by the expertise of different background
actors. If this observation is taken as a starting point of the discussion we must conclude that
there is indeed a gap considering the possibilities to (politically) contest the results, as – as has
been pointed out above – the expertise of the background actors often provides the frame for
political debates and decisions. Thus, this reduces the de facto power of the formal decision
makers to influence the actual substantive contents of the regulation, and shifts at least part of
the power over the substance of the regulation to other actors, primarily different epistemic
communities and experts. For this reason the conclusion made by the Permanent Court of
249 See also Slaughter 2000 pp. 178, 193-194: “The conventional debate over globalisation and the attendant
decline of State power is handicapped by this traditional conception of states and state institutions. In fact, the
state is not disappearing; it is disaggregating into its component institutions. The primary State actors in the
international realm are no longer foreign ministries and heads of state, but the same government institutions that
dominate domestic politics: administrative agencies, courts, and legislatures. The traditional actors continue to
play a role, but they are joined by fellow government officials pursuing quasi-autonomous policy agendas. The
disaggregated State, as opposed to the mythical unitary State, is thus hydra-headed, represented and governed by
multiple institutions in complex interaction with one another abroad as well as home.”
250 Koskenniemi 2007 p. 16, according to whom “Lauterpacht and other inter-war lawyers were right to assume
that statehood would be slowly overcome by the economic and technical laws of a globalising modernity. This is
what functional differentiation in both of its forms – fragmentation and deformalisation – has done. But they were
wrong to believe that this would lead into a cosmopolitan federation. When the floor of statehood fell from under
our feet, we did not collapse into a realm of global authenticity to encounter each other as free possessors of
inalienable rights. Instead, we fell into watertight boxes of functional specialisation, to be managed and governed
by reading our freedom as the realisation of our interest. As our feet hit the ground, we found no Kantian
federation but the naturalism of Pufendorf and Hobbes – powerful actors engaged in strategic games with their
eye on the Pareto optimum.”
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International Justice in the S.S. Wimbledon case, that the right of a state to enter into
limitations of its sovereignty is an attribute of that sovereignty, is currently only a part of the
truth251.
This observation is valid also within the context of the flexibility mechanisms, at least the
project based mechanisms, as they rely very much on the substantive, often technical,
information provided by the relevant experts.252 Thus, the tensions between the democratic
legitimacy of a special regime and the increasing reliance on expert knowledge are, indeed,
real and call for a resolution of some kind. Opportunities for politically contesting the results
that international law generates would need to be secured.253
The changes that can be seen having taken place in law have also entailed some larger
problems. International environmental treaties still need to be enacted into domestic legal
systems according to the forms and means provided for by national constitutions. However,
they often do not contain clear, detailed or specific obligations that could without any further
ado be enacted into national law. Instead, they need to be translated into more concrete
obligations and procedures in protocols and decisions adopted by the organisation set up by
the framework treaty. These more concrete obligations and procedures – and structures –
include regulation that no longer merely stipulates an end result to be achieved, but goes
further to even shaping the legal positions of individuals. The Kyoto mechanisms are a case in
point. Thus, the need to realise and somehow address the diversity of political, legal and social
contexts within which the policy initiatives are located254 is indeed present in the context of
the mechanisms.
251 See PCIJ, S.S. Wimbledon, Ser. A, No. 1, 1923 p. 25.
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